Administrative Reform in International Organizations : The Case of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

This paper focuses on the causal factors, implementati on, and side eff ects of administrati ve reforms launched within the United Nati ons system, in the fi eld of HIV and AIDS. It is based on an empirical analysis of the UNAIDS Programme, an interorganizati onal system bringing together ten UN agencies to combat the worldwide epidemic, with the support of a Secretariat. Firstly, the paper argues that the administrati ve reform of UNAIDS was unlikely to have come from the UN organizati ons themselves, although the Programme was expected to lead these organizati ons to bett er coordinate and harmonize their AIDS strategies. Secondly, it identi fi es three external factors that have led UN organizati ons to reform their governance mechanisms and procedures. Thirdly, it explores the conditi ons under which the reform of UNAIDS has been implemented since 2005, with parti cular att enti on to the Secretariat that has become involved as an acti ve “reform entrepreneur.” Finally, it identi fi es some of the unexpected eff ects of the reform, with a parti cular emphasis on competi ti on between UN agencies, organizati onal complexity, and bureaucrati zati on. The concluding remarks argue that when analyzing administrati ve reforms within internati onal organizati ons, one should investi gate the interrelati ons between the external pressures that drive reforms and the acti vity of reform entrepreneurs.