Why is the Indo-Pacific attracting so much attention? Interview with Christophe Jaffrelot, Delphine Allès, and Patrick Köllner
What is the so-called Indo-Pacific, and why is this region attracting attention as a site of global power dynamics? In the recently published Order and Agency in the Indo-Pacific, edited by Christophe Jaffrelot, Delphine Allès, and Patrick Köllner, a set of internationally recognised experts speak to and update existing scholarly discussions on Indo-Pacific dynamics, investigating the nexus of order(ing) and agency in that strategic space. The authors take strategic competition between the United States and China as a contextual given and explore the Indo-Pacific as an interregnum, in terms of institutional dynamics and in terms of geo-narratives, among other issues. Read our interview with the three editors of the book and co-organisers of the Observatory of the Indo-Pacific, the major source of the research presented in the volume.
Can you briefly define the concept of the Indo-Pacific, and why countries may choose to be part of this strategic ensemble?
Patrick Köllner: The Indo-Pacific is often referred to as the world’s new economic and strategic centre of gravity. While it includes economic powerhouses such as China and India, the Indo-Pacific makes most sense as a strategic concept. The central idea, initially advanced by strategic thinkers in India and Australia, is to bring in India to create a strategic space encompassing both the Indian and Pacific Oceans—a space that is too big to be dominated by a resurgent China. Core proponents of the concept include those that are most concerned about the military dimensions of China’s rise and the country’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in places like the South China Sea. Intent on balancing China, the United States and its allies Australia and Japan as well as India have formed the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which forms the most important institutional expression of the Indo-Pacific.
You mention that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is “inherently contestable”. Can you explain why, and why it is still a relevant analytical tool in International Relations?
Delphine Allès: The Indo-Pacific concept is inherently contestable, much like any geographic narrative that emerges from strategic agendas rather than being slowly sedimented through historical processes. One of its central paradoxes lies in the fact that while it carries profound political and geostrategic weight, it lacks both fixed geographical boundaries and institutional anchoring. Unlike the Asia-Pacific, which was materialised through APEC's concrete institutional framework, the Indo-Pacific remains a “floating signifier”: its contours and connotations vary dramatically depending on which actors mobilise it and for what purposes.
This contestability stems from three interconnected factors: first, the absence of a comprehensive multilateral organisation that could authoritatively define its scope and membership; second, the remarkable diversity of national visions that range from highly inclusive approaches emphasising economic cooperation to more exclusive security-focused frameworks designed to contain specific actors; and third, the inherent tension between preserving ASEAN's established centrality in regional architecture while accommodating extra-regional powers' expanding strategic interests.
Despite (or perhaps precisely because of) this contestability, the Indo-Pacific remains analytically compelling. It captures the contemporary reality of overlapping maritime domains where traditional regional boundaries prove inadequate for understanding current power dynamics and institutional innovations. The concept's very flexibility allows us to examine how different actors construct strategic narratives and legitimise their regional engagement, making it an invaluable lens for analysing the evolution of multilateral practices and the persistence of “multi-speed multilateralism” in contemporary international relations. Finally, for all its conceptual limitations, the concept appears to have achieved a form of permanence in regional strategic vocabulary. Most actors now explicitly engage with it, whether to embrace, adapt, or contest it. Even Chinese officials, who criticise the concept's exclusionary implications, have tacitly acknowledged it by developing counter-narratives rather than simply dismissing it: it has become an unavoidable reference point in regional strategic discourse, regardless of one's position toward it.
Why is the Indo-Pacific the world’s strategic centre of gravity?
Patrick Köllner: It is in this space that the core strategic interests of the two great powers—former hegemon the United States and rising challenger China—converge and clash. The Indo-Pacific contains strategic hotspots such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula. While China’s armed forces have grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades, the US relies not only on its own formidable military assets but also on a set of core allies in the region, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. Many small and middle powers in the Indo-Pacific have hedged their bets amidst the unfolding strategic competition and seek to pursue their own national and regional interests. To the degree that they have developed Indo-Pacific visions themselves, these tend to be more inclusive, emphasising cooperation rather than (strategic) competition. Others, such as the Pacific Island Countries, have advanced their own regional visions and narratives. These states are worried that strategic competition will have unwanted consequences, including the militarisation of the region.
You write that the Indo-Pacific has yet to experience significant institutionalisation. Can you tell us more about the form that such institutionalisation may take?
Delphine Allès: The question of institutionalisation in the Indo-Pacific reveals a compelling paradox. Rather than evolving toward the single, comprehensive institutional framework that many observers anticipate (or whose absence they lament) we are witnessing a “minilateralisation” of regional cooperation. This phenomenon manifests in several distinct forms that systematically build upon existing regional practices rather than displacing them. First, we observe the proliferation of flexible, agenda-driven partnerships such as the Quad or AUKUS, which function as “quasi-alliances” without the binding legal commitments characteristic of formal treaty organisations and without exclusionary dimensions. Second, there has been a marked multiplication of trilateral, issue-specific dialogue formats (for instance, the France-India-Australia Trilateral Dialogue, or the Japan-Australia-India Strategic Dialogue) that allow for more targeted cooperation on specific challenges. Third, we see an intensified reliance on "track 1.5" and "track 2" dialogues that deliberately blur the boundaries between official diplomacy and expert networks. This long institutionalised practice in the Asia-Pacific has now scaled up to Indo-Pacific dimensions and increasingly involves extra-regional actors.
These networks effectively construct the Indo-Pacific “from below,” progressively institutionalising it through practice despite the absence of any region-wide framework—a development that appears entirely logical given that the very geography of the Indo-Pacific remains fundamentally contested. Most significantly, any future institutionalisation will likely preserve ASEAN's established centrality while accommodating new geometries of cooperation that extend beyond traditional regional boundaries. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific exemplifies how established regional organisations can strategically adapt by embracing inclusive visions that effectively depoliticise what were initially perceived as exclusionary, Western-driven concepts. Future institutional development will probably follow this pattern of embedded multilateralism: new arrangements that explicitly reference and build upon existing frameworks rather than supplanting them entirely. The result is not institutional chaos but rather an archipelago of institutions, arranging specialised, overlapping mechanisms rather than a single, hierarchical structure governing the entire space.
What are the European Union member states relationships to the Indo-Pacific?
Christophe Jaffrelot: The Europeans try to articulate a specific approach to the Indo-Pacific that has been often presented as an alternative to the American strategy: certainly, like the US, European countries try to resist the rise of China in this meta-region, but they make a point not to alienate Beijing—something many Asian countries appreciate.
That said, there are differences between the European countries that are prepared to let NATO play a role in the Indo-Pacific and those—like France—that criticise this move. More importantly, France, partly because it is a resident power, emphasises the security dimension when Germany valorises economic cooperation and trade.
Last but not least, European countries converge toward a Europeanisation of some sort in their Indo-Pacific policy. The EU is therefore playing an increasingly important role, although the Global Gateway, CRIMARIO, and other initiatives are still works in progress.
What are the Indo-Pacific’s main challenges ahead?
Christophe Jaffrelot: The Indo-Pacific remains a very dynamic region, but it may be affected by the tariff war initiated by Donald Trump and the instability of the Middle East if trade routes are impacted and if the price of oil increases sharply. On the security front, tensions between key players like China and India may escalate. But the main challenge, in this regard, pertains to Taiwan: any Chinese attack on the island would destabilise the region. North Korea is creating another major risk as its leader remains unpredictable and has gotten closer to Russia in the context of the Ukraine war. In fact, both theatres, Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, tend to be getting more and more connected, as evident from the help South Korea is giving to Ukraine via Poland—and this development is not good for international stability either.
Interview by Miriam Périer, CERI.
