Critique internationale - Content
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Étienne Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe ? Les frontières, l’État, le peuple, Paris, La Découverte, 2001, 323 pages
Wang Bin, Weixie zhongguo de yinbi zhanzheng. Meiguo yinbi jingjizhan yu gaige xianjing [La guerre cachée qui met en péril la Chine. La guerre économique secrète de l’Amérique et le piège des réformes] Pékin, Jingji guanli chubanshe, 2000.
Han Deqiang, Quanqiuhua xianjing yu zhongguo xingshi xuanze [Collision. Le piège de la mondialisation et les choix réels de la Chine] Pékin, Jingji guanli chubanshe, 2000.
Textes parus sur des sites Internet chinois
Nye (Joseph S.), JR., The Paradox of American Power. Why America Must Join the World in order to Lead it, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 240 pages.
Bougarel (Xavier) Et Clayer (Nathalie) (dir.), Le nouvel islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme, 1990-2000, Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001, 508 pages.
Préface de Martin van Bruinessen.
Gordon (Philip H.), Meunier (Sophie), The French Challenge. Adapting to Globalization, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2001,192 pages.
Castells (Manuel), La galaxie Internet, Paris, Fayard, 2001,366 pages (traduit de l’anglais par Paul Chemla).
Abélès (Marc), Les nouveaux riches. Un ethnologue dans la Silicon Valley, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2002, 278 pages.
Libaridian(Gerard), La construction de l’État en Arménie. Un enjeu caucasien, Paris, Karthala, 2000,191 pages (traduit de l’anglais par Juliette Minces).
Smith (Zadie), White Teeth, Londres, Penguin Books, 2000, 542 pages.
Peckham (Robert Shannan), National Histories, Natural States. Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece, Londres et New York, I.B.Tauris, 2001, 224 pages.
[Why Internet will not bring democracy to China]
Too often the West tends to believe that the introduction of new information and communication technologies to China will bring about a relaxation in the authoritarian regime. Actually, WTO rules are not intended to obligate member states to respect human rights and can scarcely be diverted to this end. Moreover, the architecture of the Internet, designed to exploit user data for marketing purposes, can perfectly well be used as a tool of political surveillance. And when Chinese citizens "freely" use the Internet, it is often to tout an exaggerated sense of nationalism, certainly encouraged by the authorities, but which sometimes goes beyond their intentions. In this context, the reinforcement of security cooperation among states, democratic or not, in the wake of 9-11 can be grounds for concern. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine a realistic path (based on states' real interests) toward a global regulation of new information and communication technologies, using the very principle that gave rise to international law in general
[The birth of a trapped minority. The administration of the Arab population in the early days of the Israeli state]
During the first two decades of Israel's history, a strip of territory all along the border was placed under military administration and a special regime, both for military security purposes and better to control the Palestinian population living there. Paradox: the Israeli government gave its Palestinian residents citizenship whereas, as a "Jewish state," it could not help but consider them a "dangerous population" that had to be watched. This "ethnic" surveillance, hardly admitted for what it was, was mainly exercised under the guise of territorial measures: specific regulations for these border zones, some of which dated from the time of British rule and which enabled Israel to promote a "judaisation" of these territories and at the same time closely watch the Palestinian population still living there. The ambiguity of this inclusion/exclusion policy has given rise to multiple debates in the Knesset. The outcome is also ambiguous.
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[The end of the "North Atlantic"]
The United States were originally engaged in Europe for security reasons. Thus the change in this situation over the past decade will necessarily alter transatlantic relations. But the differences between Europeans and Americans date from long ago. The main ones have to do with U.S. exceptionalism (unilateral approach, its desire to preserve its leadership, to have military solutions to political issues and technical solutions to military problems and its failure to see the security implications of development). Among the points of discord are NATO and European defense, the Balkans, what role to assign the armed forces, that of international treaties and multilateral organizations, antimissile defense as well as regional problems, especially in the Middle East (Israel, Iraq, Iran). The 9-11 attack brought Europeans and Americans somewhat closer, but the differences are too great not to reemerge, in a perhaps more acute form.
[In the glass maze. Negotiations on the greenhouse effect]
Negotiation on climate change since its beginnings in Rio in 1992 has continually taken place in an atmosphere of misunderstanding, particularly between the United States and Europe, and has resulted in a semi-failure: the blueprint for implementing the Tokyo protocol adopted in November 2001 does not include the United States, which is precisely the largest greenhouse-gas-producing country. In reviewing the phases of this negotiation, an amazing number of missed opportunities for compromise can be counted as well as rhetoric that roots the participants in dialogs of the deaf: persistent oppositions that nothing "objectively" allowed to foresee. The mutual incomprehension that can arise in any negotiation is here coupled with a play of trick mirrors where each party uses a line of argument mainly directed at its own public opinion or its own interest groups, which the other party does not always perceive or cannot always accept often for the same, purely symboli
[A fair weather cooperation? Transatlantic merger controls]
The recent conflict between the EU and the US on the former's veto to the General Electric/Honeywell merger has often been overstated. Neither the procedural nor the doctrinal differences between the two largely self-governed agencies that decide on such affairs seems to be a recurrent source of conflict. As a rule, cooperation is fairly smooth for two main reasons: their decisions do not have a direct impact on economic policy and they do not require a cumbersome legislative process whereby international norms would have to be written into national laws. This does not imply that a fully self-governed body of international norms and rules may be derived from such regulatory activity. Both at the national and international level, it relies upon the political legitimacy as well as the authority of states. The main constraints on cooperation are twofold: a strong degree of de facto agreement upon the issue at stake and a constant defense of the regulator's political independence.
[For a monetary partnership]
International cooperation in monetary policies as it was "invented" at Bretton Woods is based on a principle of fairness and the idea of creating a legal and institutional framework limiting state sovereignty in favor of cooperation. Although this ideal did not hold up through exchange crises, the fairness principle has never explicitly been challenged, and a fairly broad consensus between Europeans and Americans has endured. However, since that episode, the IMF and the World Bank have mainly played a crisis management and consulting role in macro- and even micro-economic policy. Does the completion of the European monetary union prefigure the constitution of a large monetary bloc to compete with that of the dollar, doing away once and for all with the notion of an international monetary authority? The rising protest against "messy globalization" that has come to the fore without really threatening international financial institutions should nevertheless incite a revision of a system based on the hegemony of the strongest, the legitimacy of which is already dwindling.
