[SGCEE] Coalition Bargaining and Legislative Institutions with Radoslaw Zubek

CEE General Seminar

Sciences Po, Room K.011, 1 place Saint-Thomas d'Aquin 75007 Paris, and via Zoom*
Compulsory Registration 

Abstract

Previous work shows that robust legislative oversight institutions strengthen the ability of multi-party governments to enforce policy agreements. This raises the question of whether coalitions choose such institutions strategically. In this joint article with Tom Fleming (UCL), we introduce a formal bargaining model in which parties negotiate over legislative procedures as well as policy compromises and the allocation of ministerial posts. This model suggests that coalition partners' incentives for creating strong oversight institutions are shaped by the relative priority they place on policy and office benefits, their relative bargaining power, and the existence of outside options during coalition formation. We provide initial evidence of the model's empirical plausibility by analyzing the evolution of committee oversight procedures in the Irish parliament (Dail Eireann) over more than 100 years. These findings open interesting avenues for future work on how parties shape legislative institutions in parliamentary democracies.

Speaker

Radoslaw Zubek is an Associate Professor of European Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.

His current research focuses on coalition politics, legislative committees, and institutional change in European parliamentary democracies. He has published his work among others in American Political Science Review, Legislative Studies Quarterly, West European Politics, and the European Journal of Political Research. His is a co-leader of the ParlRulesData.org project.

Discussant

Milo Jan, Sciences Po, CEE

Chair 

Florence Faucher, Sciences Po, CEE 

Compulsory Registration

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