Japan

 

To this day, Japan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has borne the mark of Shinzô Abe, Japan’s  longest serving Prime Minister. Abe was one of the strongest advocates of the concept of the  Indo-Pacific and greatly contributed to its growing popularity in policy circles in Asia and  beyond. As early as 2007, he envisioned the emergence of this new geography in an address to  the Indian Parliament and pushed for closer quadrilateral cooperation with the US, Australia  and India. In 2016, he introduced the terminology of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FIOP),  which was then endorsed by the Trump administration and has since been continued by the  Biden administration. In many ways, with Abe’s proactive support for the Indo-Pacific idea,  Japan successfully extended its strategic horizon, gained diplomatic visibility and assumed a  leading role in shaping the perceptions and narrative of its main partners in the region.  

Statement and speeches  

Prime Minister Abe’s landmark address to the Indian Parliament in 2007 has often been cited  as one of the first official statement on the Indo-Pacific^[1]The title is based on a book written by Moghol prince Dara Shikoh in 1655. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. In this address titled Confluence of the  Two Seas, Abe envisioned the merging of the Indian and Pacific oceans into one single strategic  space, stating “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling  as seas of freedom and of prosperity”^[2]https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. He also predicted the emergence of a “‘broader Asia’  that broke away geographical boundaries”.   

Interestingly enough, Abe did not use the terminology of the “Indo-Pacific” in this seminal  address. Instead, he talked about a “broader Asia” (kakudai Ajia – 拡大アジア), thus suggesting  a westwards expansion of the Asia-Pacific toward the Indian ocean. In so doing, Abe was  careful not to alienate his domestic policy community, who remained very attached to the Asia 

Pacific framework. Japan had, indeed, strongly pushed the Asia-Pacific idea since the 1980s,  including through APEC. The Asia-Pacific thus stood as the main frame of reference for its  foreign policy community and the new notion of the Indo-Pacific was not easily adopted^[3]Jain P. and Horimoto T. (2016), “Japan and the Indo-Pacific”, in P. Chacko (ed.), New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, New York, pp. 26-42. .

Nevertheless, the Indo-Pacific idea gradually made its way in Japan’s official narrative after  Shinzô Abe came back to power in late 2012. Shortly before his return to power as Prime  Minister, Abe published an opinion piece titled Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, in which  he insisted again on the strategic interconnections between the Pacific and Indian Oceans,  stating that “peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable  from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean”^[4]https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe . In 2013, he also made  several speeches overseas, where he used the term “Indo-Pacific” per se^[5]https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201302/22speech_e.html..

Under Abe’s influence, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Defense (MoD) started using the terminology of the Indo-Pacific (indotaiheiyou – インド太平洋) from 2015 on^[6]Jain P. and Horimoto T. (2016), op. cit. The  terminology was put to the fore in the title of the India-Japan joint declaration released by Prime  ministers Abe and Modi in December 2015: Japan and India Vision 2025: Special Strategic  and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region  and the World^[7] https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html . In this declaration, India and Japan committed to “realize a peaceful, open,  equitable, stable, and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond”.

The Indo-Pacific eventually became the new frame of reference of Japan’s external policy in  mid-2016, again under the influence of Prime minister Abe, and with the addition of the two  normative adjectives of “Free” and “Open”. In August 2016, indeed, Abe presented the concept  of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FIOP) at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference for African  Development, held in Kenya. He pictured the FIOP as an ambitious strategy whereby Japan  endorsed “the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and  of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy,  free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous”^[8]https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html. The FIOP (jiyūde akareta indotaiheiyō – 自由で開 か れ た イ ン ド太平洋 ) concept was then officially presented in MOFA’s 2017  Diplomatic Bluebook^[9]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000287676.pdf. It has been a regular feature in each annual edition ever since. The MoD  has also published its own online pamphlet to explain its approach to FIOP, as well as METI^[10]https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/pamphlets/pdf/indo_pacific/indo_pacific_e_2021.pdf.

Geography

Japan has had a rather inclusive vision of the Indo-Pacific, defining it as a vast region expanding  from the Asia-Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Africa, where more than  half the world’s population lived. Interestingly, Japan’s vision of the Indo-Pacific has kept  expanding eastward over the years:  

• MOFA’s first map of the Indo-Pacific, which was released in the 2017 Bluebook, was  centered on the Indian Ocean littoral and Southeast Asia. It showed a yellowish ellipse,  which started (clockwise) with peninsular India and Bangladesh, then included  Southeast Asia (from Myanmar to the Philippines Sea), Northwestern Australia,  Madagascar and East Africa’s littoral (from Mozambique to Djibouti) as well as Yemen  and Oman^[11]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000287676.pdf. 
• MOFA’s 2018 Bluebook showed a larger geography, with an ellipse incorporating  Northeast Asia (China, the Korean peninsula and Japan itself) as well as the whole  Pacific Ocean (till the Mexican coast) and Oceania^[12]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000401241.pdf.
• MOFA’s online document titled Free and Open Indo-Pacific Basic Thinking Material shows an even larger version of the Indo-Pacific^[13] https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page25e_000278.html. The yellowish ellipse starts (clockwise) with Japan and Kamchatka and includes the United States, part of South  American (Columbia, Ecuador and Peru), the whole Pacific Ocean and the entire littoral  of the Indian Ocean

Objectives

Far from being static, Japan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has been flexible and has evolved  with time. For instance, during his first stint as Prime minister, Abe pushed a vision of the Indo Pacific with a focus on political values. This was a time when Japan was experimenting with  the idea of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and pursuing a value-based diplomacy,  promoting ““universal values” such as freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and  the market economy”^[14]https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/horizons.pdf. But after he came back to power, Abe’s approach to the Indo-Pacific  centered on rules, norms and standards, rather than political values as such.^[15]Yoshimatsu H. (2018), “Japan’s role conception in multilateral initiatives: the evolution from  Hatoyama to Abe”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72:2, pp. 129-144; Hosoya Y. … Continue reading

In this respect, a crucial goal of Japan’s FIOP has been to promote a rules-based order.  Strengthening existing rules and making new ones to ensure a stable and pacific international  order have indeed been seen as critical to Japan’s security and prosperity. Japan’s emphasis on  rules has applied to different fields, with a special focus on the maritime domain. As it is  critically dependent on unimpeded maritime free flow in the Indian and Western Pacific oceans,  Japan has proactively promoted a rules-based maritime order based on respect for sovereignty,  freedom of navigation and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In so doing,  Japan has also aimed to constrain China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force  in the East and South China Seas. 

Another major goal has been to sustain a rules-based order in international trade and finance.  As stated by MOFA, Japan sees itself as “a flagbearer of free trade” and intends “to leads the  efforts to make rules in the twenty-first century to expand a free and fair economic area”^[16]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf. Setting good and efficient rules and standards has indeed been seen as the best way to facilitate  the expansion of Japan’s business activities^[17]Katada S. (2021), “Carrying the Torch of Free Trade in the Indo-Pacific: Japan’s Challenging Role”,  NBR, May 6: … Continue reading. After the US under the Trump administration  withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in early 2017, Japan took over  from the US and brought the negotiation process to a successful conclusion. The  Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP11  Agreement) entered into force on 30 December 2018 with eleven members on both sides of the  Pacific. Since then, Japan has promoted the CPTPP as a rule-setting mechanism. In the same  fashion, Japan also concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU in 2018 and  helped finalize the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiation, with  China as a member, in 2020. 

In promoting a rules-based order, Japan has aimed at defending the regional order built by the  US after the Pacific War. Japan has indeed benefited from the US-led “liberal” order and has been anxious to maintain it, especially as the US will and capability to remain engaged in Asia  have looked uncertain. In other words, a major objective of Japan’s FIOP has been to retain and  reinforce the US commitment to preserving the security and economic stability of the region.  This is illustrated in Japan’s efforts to keep the door of CPTPP open in case the US wants to  get back in.  

Closely related to the aforementioned goal, Japan has also sought to respond to China’s growing  clout. Japan has indeed been very concerned about China’s expanding influence, which it has  seen as undermining the US-led post-war order. Japan has been even more concerned about  China’s assertiveness and coercive tactics in its own surrounding environment, on the Senkaku  / Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan^[18]The Senkaku/Diaoyu and Taiwan are located within a distance of 170 km away from each other. . In many ways, FIOP has provided a global platform to organize  Japan’s response to the China challenge. This response has been multitrack: one the one hand,  Japan has engaged China and encouraged it to abide by international norms and rules, and, on  the other, it has been proactive in building a network of partnerships with like-minded countries  to organize a pushback against China on the diplomatic, ideological, economic and security  fronts. In other words, FIOP has allowed Japan to combine cooperative and competitive policies  to deal with China and to adjust the mix of competitive/cooperative elements according to the  circumstances^[19]https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/actions/201712/04taiwa_kangei.html.

A final objective of Japan’s FIOP has been to enhance connectivity. The idea of a growing  interconnexion between the Indian and Pacific oceans has been at the heart of Japan’s vision of  the Indo-Pacific from the very beginning. Later, when Prime Minister Abe presented the FIOP  strategy in mid-2016, he extended into a grand proposal to bridge the Asian and Africa  continents. Financing and developing infrastructure within and across the region have for long  been part of Japan’s foreign policy. But, this focus on infrastructure and connectivity has  acquired added relevance since China initiated its own connectivity megaproject under BRI. In  this regard, Japan’s effort at enhancing connectivity can also be seen as a response to China’s  BRI and reflects Japan’s determination to remain a major power in this crucial area.  

Means

To implement its FIOP vision, Japan has used a whole-of-government approach, involving  coordination among various ministries and public agencies, as well as with the private sector,  on a rather wide range of activities. In this respect, a major policy tool for FIOP has been Japan’s  well-oiled development assistance and infrastructure financing mechanisms. In 2016, Prime  Minister Abe announced the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, with an  “approximately US$ 200 billion in public and private capital for five years from 2017 till 2021  for infrastructure projects across the world”^[20]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf. Out of these US$ 200 billion, about USD 110 billion were dedicated to Asia (as part of the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure program  launched the year before, in 2015)^[21]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000117998.pdf.

The emphasis on “Quality infrastructure” has been central to Japan’s FIOP approach. It has  allowed Japan to set high standards for infrastructure development overseas, in terms of cost effectiveness, sustainability, environment protection and social responsibility. Japan even had its main partners at the G7 and G20 endorse these high standards (in 2016 and 2019  respectively). More to the point, Japan has used the concept of “quality infrastructure” as a  smart tool to 1/ highlight the superiority of its development projects in comparison to China’s  BRI; 2/ encourage China to meet the higher standards it had set. Indeed, while initially very  cautious toward China’s BRI, Japan softened its approach by mid-2017, when Prime Minister  Abe suggested that FIOP could coordinate with BRI as long as such coordination met  internationally recognized standards^[22]Pajon C. (2019), “Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Shaping a Hybrid Regional Order”,Warontherocks,  December 18: https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/japans-indo-pacific-strategy-shaping-a-hybrid … Continue reading. Closely related to this, Japan has developed training  programs on fiscal policy and public debt management aimed at some countries heavily  indebted to China (fiscal policy experts have been sent to Mozambique, Zambia, Laos,  Maldives).  

To support freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, the Japan Maritime  Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) have increased multilateral exercises, capacity-building  activities and naval operations. The loosening of the legal constraints on collective self-defense in 2014 have allowed Japan to be more proactive in shaping regional security, especially in the  maritime field. Japan has sent its biggest surface combatants (large helicopter destroyers) on  months-long deployments in the Indo-Pacific on a yearly basis since 2017^[23]These overseas deployments were originally known under the name of ISEAD (Indo-South East Asia  Deployment). They have been rebranded as IDP (Indo-Pacific Deployment) since 2019.. As explained by  the MOD, the objective of these Indo-Pacific Deployments (IDPs) is to “conduct joint exercises  (…) with the navies and other armed forces of other countries to improve its tactical capabilities  and strengthen its coordination with foreign forces”^[24]https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/exercises/IPD19.html. JMSDF have also carried out multilateral  exercises to enhance interoperability with priority partners (US, Australia, India, France, the  UK).  

With the same objective of contributing to maritime security, the Japan Coast Guard and MoD have focused on providing equipment and training for maritime law enforcement agencies in  Southeast Asia^[25]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100056243.pdf. For instance, Japan has transferred patrol vessels and equipment for maritime  safety to Vietnam and the Philippines, and dispatched experts to coastal nations along major  sea lanes including Indonesia and Malaysia. In 2018, Japan started supporting the maritime  security capabilities of Indian Ocean countries such as Djibouti and Sri Lanka.  

Coalition-building has also been an important means to pushing Japan’s FIOP^[26]Koga (2020), op. cit.. In particular,  Japan has actively committed to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, a ministerial-level  cooperation mechanism with Australia and the United States, which has been running since 2006 and involved military drills. Along with these two close partners, Japan has more recently developed the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific^[27]https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000420368.pdf. In a first,  Japan, the US and Australia announced a joint project for financing an undersea fiber optic cable to Palau in October 2020. Since 2019, the three partners have also spearheaded the Blue.  Dot Network, an initiative focused on high-standard certification and advisory for infrastructure  projects (in terms of transparency, sustainability and market-compliance)^[28]Fang A. (2021), “Biden pushes Belt and Road rival ‘Blue Dot’ with Japan and Australia”, Nikkei Asia,  June 9,  .

To push its FIOP vision, Japan has been involved in other trilateral formats, including one with  the US and India, and another with India and Australia. While these trilaterals have reached  various level of institutional cooperation, they have both served as building blocks for the  reviving of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017. Interestingly, Japan’s METI  has used the Japan-India-Australia trilateral to initiate the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative  (SCRI) in September 2020, with a view to foster coordination on the reorganization of supply  chains away from China^[29]https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2021/04/20210427004/20210427004-1.pdf. As for the Quad, Japan has been a constant and enduring proponent  of the idea. In particular, Prime Minister Abe proved to be instrumental in convincing Indian  Prime Minister Modi to reactivate the Quad in 2017. 

Partnerships

Japan regards its alliance with the US as the “linchpin of (its) foreign policy and security as  well as the cornerstone of the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region”^[30]https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page3e_001106.html. In other words,  the US is Japan’s priority partner for advancing its FIOP vision. In 2015, the two countries  strengthened their alliance by revising the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, thus paving the way  for a bigger security role for Japan. They have also increased the number of their joint exercises  and aligned their positions on the promotion of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (despite the fact  that the US FIOP has been more anti-China than Japan’s). They have initiated coordination in  specific sectors, as shown by the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on Advancing a Free and Open  Indo-Pacific Through Energy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooperation in  November 2018^[31]https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/u-s-japan-joint-statement-advancing-free open-indo-pacific-energy-infrastructure-digital-connectivity-cooperation/.

In pushing FIOP, Japan has been eager to build a network of partnerships with like-minded  nations, including with Australia, India and ASEAN, as well as with countries in Europe. Australia for instance has become its closest security partner after the US (in November 2020, the two reached an agreement in principle on a reciprocal access agreement). Japan has also  identified India as a critical partner. It has not only provided India with massive ODA for its  own connectivity needs, but also begun to develop joint connectivity projects with India in third  countries (Bangladesh and Myanmar). In the defense sector, Japan and India have also forged  close cooperation and held bilateral/multilateral exercises between all three components of their  defense forces, while agreeing to a military logistics pact in September 2020. 

While originally centered on the Quad, with the US, Japan and India as priority partners, Japan’s  FIOP has shifted to a more inclusive approach, emphasizing ASEAN centrality. By 2017-18,  Japan undertook to win over Southeast Asian countries wary of the FIOP concept. In 2018 for  instance, it replaced the term “strategy” that had been associated with FIOP since mid-2016, with that of “vision” to accommodate ASEAN, for which “strategy” sounded too assertive and anti-China^[32]Tajima Y. (2018),“Abe softens tone on Indo-Pacific to coax China’s ASEAN friends”, Nikkei Asia,  November 13. . Moreover, Japan alleviated ASEAN’s concerns by clarifying that its FOIP vision did not imply the creation of new institutions to compete with those supported by ASEAN. It  even committed to contributing to ASEAN’s own Indo-Pacific vision (ASEAN Outlook on the  Indo-Pacific) in specific areas^[33]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100114942.pdf.  

Japan has also engaged European countries in its quest to push its FIOP vision. “2-plus-2”  dialogues with the UK, France (and Germany since 2021) have helped forge cooperation on  security issues. Japan has also deepened relations with the EU since 2018 and has pushed  cooperation in the connectivity sector, as reflected by the September 2019 EU–Japan  Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure^[34]https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000521432.pdf. In addition to the  aforementioned partnerships, Japan has included multilateral groupings such as APEC and the  Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) to its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”.