France

France and the Indo-Pacific

France has the particularity of having interests of sovereignty in the region. The country sees itself as a “sovereign nation of the Indo-Pacific”^[1] Ministry of the Armed Forces, France’s Defence Strategy in Indo-Pacific (DICOD, 2019), p.7. with interests in the region due to its French overseas territories, located in the Pacific (New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis et Futuna) and in the Indian Ocean (La Réunion, Mayotte, the Scattered Islands and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories), having around 1.6 million French citizens, 8,000 permanent military personnel, and 93% of its exclusive economic zone in this region (amounting to 9 million km square).

As a result, France’s defence strategy highlights that the country’s main security interest in the Indo-Pacific region are “to protect our sovereign territories, secure our strategic supplies, ensure our freedom of action in the commons, and foster stable regional environments,” in a context where, because of new security dynamics, “France needs to reaffirm its strategic autonomy, the importance of its alliances and its commitment to multilateralism^[2]Ibid, p.5..

President Emmanuel Macron defined the broad lines of France’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific through several speeches. His speech at Garden Island naval base in Sydney, on the 2nd May 2018, first outlined France’s new orientations and commitment in the Indo-Pacific region. On this occasion, he asserted that “France [was] fully committed to this part of the globe and France now [wanted] to endorse this role as an … Indo-Pacific power alongside with its partners”, highlighting “a new series of game changers” that include “the evolution of Chinese strategy in the region”. He advocated the emergence of a new “Indo-Pacific axis” with France, India and Australia^[3]Speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Discours à Garden Island, base navale de Sydney”, 2 May 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/05/03/discours-a-garden-island-base-navale-de-sydney. He also presented “France’s four key commitments in the Indo-Pacific: 1) the support to peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue, 2) French contribution to regional peace and security, 3) French involvement to sustain regional States sovereignty, 4) the need to take actions against climate change.”^[4]As explained in France’s Defence Strategy in Indo-Pacific, see p.12.

In a speech at La Réunion, in October 2019, Emmanuel Macron further elaborated on the idea that France had a role to play in collective security so that the Indo-Pacific space can continue to be a “space of freedom and sovereignty safeguarding one another”. He also identified three axes that constitute the French strategy: security, climate and biodiversity-related, and economic axes^[5]Translated by the author. Speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Choose La Réunion : unis dans l’espace Indo-Pacifique”, 23 October 2019, … Continue reading.

In the wake of this presidential impetus, both the Ministry of Armed Forces and the Ministry of External Affairs published documents further defining this strategy. Following French Minister of Defense Florence Parly’s speech at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue, which articulated five strategic priorities in France’s action in the region (see below), the Ministry of Armed Forces published France’s Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific. That document defines France’s commitments in the Indo-Pacific and sets the Ministry’s strategic orientations in this region. The French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE) published The French Strategy in the Indo-Pacific^[6]Directorate for Asia and Oceania, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Strategy for the Indo-Pacific: For an Inclusive Indo-Pacific (2019). .

France’s strategy is characterised by the fact of being inclusive, having a strong military dimension but also several other dimensions (economic, climate, multilateralism). The MEAE framed the Indo-Pacific region as a ‘priority for France’ and ‘at the heart’ of a strategy to promote a ‘stable, multipolar order based on the rule of law and free movement, and far and efficient multilateralism’^[7]French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France”, … Continue reading. 

France’s national strategy is complemented by a strategy on the Indo-Pacific which will be released by the European Union in September 2021.

What underpins France’s renewed interest in the region through the lens of the “Indo-Pacific” are changing strategic dynamics and in particular, according to analysts, China’s rise and increasing assertiveness^[8] Françoise Nicolas, “France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy : Inclusive and principled”, East Asia Forum, 12 December 2019, … Continue reading. Parly argued that cooperation was “more necessary than ever, given Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges”, with the emergence of “the building blocks of a global confrontation”^[9]Speech by Florence Parly, 1 June 2019, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, … Continue reading.

Geography

Several geographical delimitations have been provided, which are all characterised by encompassing the East coast of Africa.

The 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security defined France’s main “strategic axis” as “stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean, with possible extension towards Asia”^[10]Présidence de la République, The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (New York: Odile Jacob Publishing Corporation, 2008), p.136.. 

In its 2019 Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the French Ministry for the Armed Forces defined the Indo- Pacific as “[spanning] from Djibouti to Polynesia”, with “[v]ital maritime routes [running] from Indonesia to Madagascar, from Oman to Singapore, from Japan to Australia, and from China to Polynesia”^[11]France’s Defence Strategy in Indo-Pacific, p.7..

In his speech at the Reunion in October 2019, Emmanuel Macron stated that “the Indo-Pacific stretches from the shores of East and Southern Africa to the coasts of America”^[12]Translation by the author. In Speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Choose La Réunion : unis dans l’espace Indo-Pacifique”, 23 October 2019. .

Objectives

France’s objectives are articulated around several principles and priorities in the Indo-Pacific.

The Defence Strategy states that France’s actions are underpinned by two principles: 1) the protection and promotion of a rules-based multilateral order, which involves opposing restrictions to freedom of navigation in the international air-sea commons, and 2) the preservation of “strategic balances”, combatting transnational terrorism, addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and countering influence operations “aimed at eroding the legitimacy of democratic regimes”^[13]France’s Defence Strategy in Indo-Pacific, p.7.

According to the same document, France’s two main priorities for its action in the region are strategic autonomy and multilateralism. These encompass more specific strategic priorities: 

1. “[defending] the integrity of France’s sovereignty and the protection of nationals, territories and EEZ”;
2.  “[Contributing] to the Security of Regional Spaces Around Overseas Territories through the Promotion of Military Cooperation and Synergies”;
3. “[Maintaining], with [its] Partners, a Free and Open Access to the Commons”, that is, the “integrity of the air and maritime routes, as well as of the terrestrial hubs” of the Indo-Pacific;
4. Assisting in “maintaining strategic stability and security balances through a global multilateral action” and by upholding the respect for international law, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and strengthening the multilateral dialogue and consultation process.^[14]Ibid, pp.12-17. 

In 2019, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, French Minister of Defense Florence Parly mentioned the additional French priority of tackling climate change.^[15]Speech by Florence Parly, 1 June 2019, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.

As stated by President Macron in his speech at La Réunion, the French strategy is articulated around several axes around which to build cooperation:

1. building a “common security agenda (…) of maritime surveillance, of protecting marine environment (…) to avoid any form of hegemony or intrusion”;
2. fighting against global warming and for the protection of biodiversity”; 
3. building an economic strategy based on several pillars. The first pillar is connectivity: France should work with trusted partners on connectivity and physical and digital infrastructures, including the strategic issue of fiber optic submarine cables. The second pillar is sustainable development, including an environmental dimension, to develop a strategy of regional energy network and an “ambitious” agenda on renewable energies, and to reduce France’s food dependence. The third pillar is the strengthening of human, touristic, university, scientific exchanges. Emmanuel Macron wants to launch an “Erasmus of the Indian Ocean” to this effect. He also spoke of his desire that France takes the initiative to build regular regional economic fora in the region.^[16]Speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Choose La Réunion : unis dans l’espace Indo-Pacifique”, 23 October 2019.

Means

France has been increasingly involved in the region since the 2010s.^[17]François Godement, “France’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 12 May 2014. Mentioned in Gilli, “France’s new raison d’être in the Indo-Pacific”, in Mind … Continue reading Its involvement in the region has taken multiple forms: military, economic, diplomatic, in cooperation with other actors in the region. However, it has been characterized by a logic of strategic partnership to build an inclusive architecture of norms and pool resources for shared objectives with partners.

The role of military presence

France has five military commands and three bases in the region. French armed forces are deployed in the Indo-Pacific region to protect overseas territories and carry out surveillance: The French Armed Forces in Southwest Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) in La Reunion and Mayotte and the French Armed Forces in New-Caledonia (FANC) and in French Polynesia (FAPF) in the Pacific Ocean. In addition to these three sovereign forces, France has two presence forces (FFEAU, FFD) as well as a network of 18 Defence Attachés in 33 countries.^[18]France’s Defence Strategy in Indo-Pacific, p.7.

The role of French overseas territories

The French Indo-Pacific Strategy presents overseas territories as “essential to France’s security activities in the Indo-Pacific” because 1) they “play a key role to secure access to vital areas and routes that could otherwise come under threat, such as maritime straits”, 2) they also play a role to secure French “sovereign territories as well as the commons around them”, 3) they “facilitate military cooperation, crisis anticipation and regional integration”, and finally 4) they “provide safe platforms for power projection in the whole region” ^[19]Ibid.

The promotion of multilateral institutions/for a/mechamisms

France is present in regional multilateral fora, institutions, and dialogues, and supports the strengthening of multilateral institutions in the region, notably: 

-The Indian Ocean Commission, created in 1982, of which France is a member through La Réunion since 1986.

-The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), founded in 1995, which France joined in December 2020.

-The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, created in 2008, and of which France is a member.

France is also a member of the Pacific QUAD (Quadrilateral Defense Coordination Group), and part of the FRANZ agreement, signed in 1992 with New Zealand and Australia.

Defence and security cooperation 

France has increased its defence and security cooperation in the region, notably through its participation in several defence dialogues, new defence cooperation agreements, joint naval exercises, and surveillance missions.

Action on climate and biodiversity

France launched the International Solar Alliance with India in 2018 and the reform of the governance of the UN-financial mechanism of the Green Climate Fund; it involved the Agence Française de Développement; and it cooperates with states in the region.

Partnerships

Partnerships are a key component of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. While earlier focused on China, from the presidency of François Hollande (2012–2017), France diversified its political and diplomatic focus toward other countries of the region, both because it looked for new economic opportunities and because it sought to develop or deepen existing political and security partnerships.^[20] Gilli, “France’s new raison d’être in the Indo-Pacific”, p.19.

Strategic partners

France has strengthened bilateral relations with key partners:

• India: France has had a long-standing and strong bilateral partnership for several decades with India, and negotiated several arms deals with New Delhi^[21]In 2006, India bought six Scorpène submarines from Naval Group and, in 2016, 36 Rafale fighter jets from Dassault. . Following the launch of a  strategic partnership in 1998, cooperation has been strengthened through the development of a “new strategic agenda”^[22]Translated by the author. In speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Choose La Réunion: unis dans l’espace Indo-Pacifique”, 23 October 2019. , illustrated in 2018 by the joint signature of a Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region^[23]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region”, New Delhi, 10 March 2018, … Continue reading. That year, the two countries also signed a Logistic Support agreement.^[24]“India France sign strategic pact on use of each other’s military bases”, The Times of India, 10 March 2018, … Continue reading They have deepened their cooperation notably in the fields of maritime security and renewable energies.
• Japan: France and Japan established a strategic partnership in 1995, and today cooperate in a large array of domains. In June 2019, the two countries issued a five-year roadmap that aims at reinforcing their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region in the fields of maritime security, climate, environment and biodiversity, infrastructures, and health.^[25]“Feuille de route sur la cooperation franco-japonaise pour ouvrir de nouveaux horizons entre la France et le Japon dans le cadre du partenariat d’exception (2019-2023) ”, … Continue reading 
• Australia: Until September 2021, the partnership was based on strong security and defence cooperation. In 2017, France and Australia signed a Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership^[26]Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Joint statement of enhanced strategic partnership between Australia and France”, 3 March 2017, … Continue reading, as well as cooperation agreements in 2018. They also signed a contract for Scorpène submarines to be built by Naval Group for the Australian Navy^[27]Franz-Stefan Gady, “Australia, France Sign $35.5 Billion Submarine Contract”, The Diplomat, 11February 2019,  … Continue reading. Macron called for the creation of a Strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis, which he saw as “absolutely key for the region and our joint objectives in the Indian-Pacific region”.^[28]“Macron wants strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis amid Pacific tensions”, Reuters, 2 May 2018,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-france-idUSKBN1I330F This new context has led the three countries to cooperate in the fields of maritime security, environment and marine resources management, and collaboration in multilateral organisations. In 2019, France and Australia launched a bilateral security dialogue. However, in September 2021, as a new trilateral security pact called “AUKUS” was announced by the US, the UK, and Australia, France learnt that this pact involved a nuclear-powered submarine deal between Australia and the US that scrapped the French-Australian deal for Scorpène submarines. This news and its consequences have greatly impacted the trust between the two partners and leave uncertain the future of the strategic partnership between France and Australia.

Partnership with the ASEAN

France has strengthened its partnership with ASEAN countries: Indonesia (2011), Singapore (2012) and Vietnam (2013). In 2021, ASEAN foreign ministers conferred to France the status of Development Partner of ASEAN, indicating a mutual desire to further develop and strengthen their cooperation.^[29]ASEAN, France formalise Development Partnership”, website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 4 March 2021, https://asean.org/asean-france-formalise-development-partnership/ At the defence level, France works with the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). Beyond bilateral relations, the AFD funds projects in the region.

The European Union

Following the release of an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, France is to work with the EU, and its other partners, on building a “real political, economic and environmental strategy” in the region.^[30]Translated by the author. In Speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Choose La Réunion : unis dans l’espace Indo-Pacifique”, 23 October 2019.

The United States

The Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific mentions that France and the United States share “the same values and concerns about emerging challenges” and have a “particularly strong defence relationship”. It further highlights that the US is “an historic ally and a central partner in the Indo-Pacific, due to our converging security and defence interests and the high level of interoperability between our forces.” However, at the same time, the strategy also mentions that “the United States and China are engaged in a global strategic Competition.”^[31]France’s Defence Strategy in Indo-Pacific, pp. 8 and 17. This tension is pinpointed by Nilanthi Samaranayake in her article “Future US-France Cooperation: Think Indo-Pacific”, The Diplomat, 3 … Continue reading

Other partners

In the region, France also has good bilateral relations with South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Singapore, and South Africa.

France has the particularity of putting emphasis on engaging Africa in the context of its larger Indo-Pacific engagement.^[32] See for instance the speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs”, 27 août 2018,  … Continue reading

“Plurilateralism” and ambivalence vis-à-vis China

In August 2018, in a speech to French ambassadors, Emmanuel Macron declared that France should “build a new relationship with Asia” that will be build “notably around [an] essential and fruitful dialogue with China”.^[33] Translated by the author. In speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des Ambassadeurs”, 27 août 2018. 

In this perspective, France has promoted an inclusive vision of the Indo-Pacific. It has not opposed the Belt and Road Initiative and has sought to present a non-confrontational posture towards China. Emmanuel Macron did not directly refer to China in his speech in Sydney, France’s strategy does not identify an enemy, and Paris rejects the idea that French military deployment aim at containing China.^[34]Emanuele Scimia, “China isn’t our target, says French Pacific naval commander”, Asia Times, 25 August 2018, … Continue reading To a larger extent, Paris opposes a discourse of containment.

However, at the same time, France keeps strong links with the United States and share the same objectives of opposing China’s militarization and defending the freedom of navigation, including in the South China Sea which, as an analyst notes, could be perceived as anti-China.^[35] Nicolas, “France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy : Inclusive and principled”. On the economic front, France’s strategy can be seen as a response to China’s diplomacy and infrastructure projects in the region, insofar as Emmanuel Macron’s stated objective os to build infrastructures that “ensure the free circulation of people, information and goods, and be economically sustainable projects that safeguard States’ sovereignty in terms of debt”.^[36] Translated by the author. In Speech by Emmanuel Macron, “Choose La Réunion : unis dans l’espace Indo-Pacifique”, 23 October 2019. He mentioned the case of Sri Lanka, which is indebted towards China, as a counterexample of what France wanted to do.