India

India has been one of the first countries to adopt the concept of the Indo-Pacific. In particular, Prime Minister Narendra Modi shared his vision of the Indo-Pacific for the first time on June 1, 2018 at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore^[1]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shanri-la Dialogue”, 1 June 2018, … Continue reading. In his speech he claimed that the Indo-Pacific “stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity” and “includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it.”^[2]Ibid.

PM Modi’s speech was a culmination of earlier efforts in India to articulate elements of its new engagement in the region:

• In January 2015, India and the United States issued a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.^[3]The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region”, 25 January 2015, … Continue reading
• In March 2015, in a speech in Mauritius, PM Modi introduced the concept of SAGAR meaning “ocean” in Hindi, and an acronym for “Security and Growth for All in the Region”). He asserted that the “Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities. Our vision for Indian Ocean Region is rooted in advancing cooperation in our region; and, to use our capabilities for the benefit of all in our common maritime home. …We seek a future for [the] Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region.”^[4]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Remarks at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Barracuda in Mauritius”, 12 March 2015, … Continue reading
• In December 2015, India released its first joint statement on the Indo-Pacific with Japan, entitled India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World. The two countries “pledged to work for the peace, security and development of the Indo-Pacific region towards 2025 underpinned by [the] principles” of “sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; democracy, human rights and the rule of law; open global trade regime; and freedom of navigation and overflight.”^[5]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the … Continue reading

Concomitant with these developments, India’s foreign policy has gradually shifted focus towards the maritime domain. An illustration of this evolution, the Indian Navy has released several policy documents concerning doctrines and strategies: the Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004, revised in 2009)^[6]Indian Ministry of Defence (Navy), “Indian Maritime Doctrine”, New Delhi, 2009, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf, and Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (2007) reflected the Navy’s maritime strategic outlook. In his foreword to Ensuring Secure Seas: India’s Maritime Security Strategy (2015), India’s Chief of Naval Staff highlighted that ‘[t]he shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways.’^[7]Admiral R.K. Dhowan, “Foreword”, in Indian Ministry of Defence (Navy), “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, New Delhi, 2015, … Continue reading

Geography

 The Indo-Pacific described in Modi’s 2018 Shangri-la Dialogue speech extends “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”.

While the Indian Ministry of External Affairs claims that “India’s Indo-Pacific vision is premised upon the principle of ASEAN-Centrality”^[8]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Indo-Pacific Division Brief”, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf, at the same time, the Indian Ocean clearly occupies the epicentre of the Indian definition of the Indo-Pacific. In his last book, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, the Minister of External Affairs, points out that India’s Indo-Pacific strategy relies on three “concentric circles”. The first circle is largely domestic: the priority is to upgrade India’s ports. Several close neighbouring countries separated by the sea – Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles – are part of a second circle. The third circle remains undefined but is apparently made of the rest of the Indian ocean. He concludes that the real challenge is “the revival of the Indian Ocean as a community that builds on its historical and cultural foundations”.^[9]S. Jaishankar, The India Way. Strategies for an Uncertain World (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2020), p. 186.

Indian efforts to combine the centrality of the Indian Ocean and the that of ASEAN within the framework of the Indo-Pacific became manifest in the meeting held in Delhi on 13-14 December 2019. This “Dialogue-XI” with ASEAN member states had a revealing title: Indo-Pacific: Re-imagining the Indian Ocean through an Expanded Geography.^[10]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “11th Delhi Dialogue; 6th Indian Ocean Dialogue and associated events (December 13-14, 2019)”, 10 December 2019, … Continue reading

Objectives

In his 2018 Shangri-La speech, referred to above, Narendra Modi presented his vision of the Indo-Pacific as a means of supporting principles which have been dear to India for several decades. These, notably, are reiterated in the BRICS summits and encompass principles such as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, and adherence to international rules and laws.

Modi defined India’s “vision of an open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”^[11]Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shanri-la Dialogue”, 1 June 2018. around several key ideas:

1. “a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it.”
2. A rules-based international order: “our common prosperity and security require us to evolve, through dialogue, a common rules-based order for the region. And, it must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons. Such an order must believe in sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as equality of all nations, irrespective of size and strength. These rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few. This must be based on faith in dialogue, and not dependence on force. It also means that when nations make international commitments, they must uphold them. This is the foundation of India’s faith in multilateralism and regionalism; and, of our principled commitment to (the) rule of law.”
3. Equal access to the use of common spaces: “We should all have equal access as a right under international law to the use of common spaces on sea and in the air that would require freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.”
4. An open and stable international trade regime: “Solutions cannot be found behind walls of protection …. What we seek is a level playing field for all. India stands for open and stable international trade regime. We will also support a rules-based, open, balanced and stable trade environment in the Indo-Pacific Region, which lifts up all nations on the tide of trade and investment.”
5. Connectivity along certain principles: “Connectivity is vital. It does more than enhance trade and prosperity. It unites a region. …. We understand the benefits of connectivity. There are many connectivity initiatives in the region. If these have to succeed, we must not only build infrastructure, we must also build bridges of trust. And for that, these initiatives must be based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consultation, good governance, transparency, viability and sustainability. They must empower nations, not place them under impossible debt burden. They must promote trade, not strategic competition. On these principles, we are prepared to work with everyone. India is doing its part, by itself and in partnership with others like Japan – in South Asia and Southeast Asia, in the Indian Ocean, Africa, West Asia and beyond. And, we are important stake-holders in New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”^[12]Ibid.

These official declarations avoid defining an adversary. Yet,  Indian experts also consider that the adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept is a way to “balance China”^[13]See the views that C. Rajah Mohan expressed in the inaugural session of the CERI-GIGA Franco-German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific … Continue reading. For these observers, India’s approach to the region has been shaped by a new strategic environment “coinciding with the rise of China”.^[14]Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theatre of Opportunity”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 June 2020, … Continue reading From this perspective, India’s new foreign policy orientation can be seen as a response to China’s expanding influence and presence in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean region, and to a context of increasing strategic competition in India’s neighbourhood and beyond. In 2017, New Delhi had openly raised concerns about China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the global initiative of infrastructure and connectivity projects announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. At the economic level, some of India’s new partnerships enshrined within the discourse of the Indo-Pacific, for instance with Japan in Sri Lanka, have been perceived as a both countering – as well as a potential alternative to – BRI infrastructure projects.^[15]Editorials, “India and Japan can provide an alternative to BRI”, The Hindustan Times, 21 May 2019,  … Continue reading

At another level, one analyst has noted that “the ability to sustain a military presence near the key choke points connecting [the] trade routes [of the Indian Ocean]” is “at the heart of the geopolitical struggle” in the region.^[16][1] Darshana M. Baruah, “What is happening in the Indian Ocean?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 March 2021, … Continue reading The Indian Navy has recognized the strategic importance of sea lanes of communication of the region and the need to protect them. The 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy notes that “Protection of India’s SLOCs, and carriage of national trade and cargo therein, will be an essential component of the strategy for conflict.”^[17]Indian Ministry of Defense (Navy), “Ensuring Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, p.73, … Continue reading

To a larger extent, experts have seen India’s new Indo-Pacific approach as “an opportunity to expand its footprint across the region while facing significant capacity and capital constraints”.^[18]https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/30/india-in-indo-pacific-new-delhi-s-theater-of-opportunity-pub-82205 Its new approach would offer “new opportunities to India’s great power ambitions”, while providing New Delhi an opportunity to address a new security and strategic environment through new partnerships.^[19]Ibid. India’s goal would therefore be to “use the Indo-Pacific as a tool to advance its strategic interests and respond to a changing security environment.”^[20]Ibid.

Means

To deepen its economic and defence cooperation in the region, India is relying on various means.

India has adapted its diplomatic machinery to the Indo-Pacific, as shown initially in the creation of a new division within its Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian Ocean Region Division, followed by the creation of an Indo-Pacific division in 2019.

More importantly, India has invested in the Indian Navy. Recently, in November 2020, Union Minister of State for Defence Shripad Naik announced that expected orders for surface ships and submarines to be executed from 2020 to 2030 by the Indian Navy amounted to approximately $51 billion, while also highlighting that 60 per cent of the Indian Navy’s budget was dedicated to capital expenditure.^[21][1] “$51 billion orders likely to be executed by navy for surface ships, submarines in 10 years: Govt”, The Economic Times, 27 November 2020, … Continue reading It remains, however, that the Navy has been under-resourced in comparison to the army and the air force. In the defence budget of 2020-2021, it was allocated only 15% of the defence budget (that is, approximately, $6.70 billion),^[22]That is, Rs. 496 230 000 000. compared with 23% for the Air Force and 56% for the Army.^[23]Laxman Kumar Behera, “India’s defence budget 2020-21”, IDSA Issue Brief, 4 February 2020, https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-def-budget-2020-21-lkbehera-040220. Under revised estimates, the new Budget 2021-22 proposed a decline in the total capital outlay earmarked for the Navy compared to the previous year’s Revised Estimates.^[24]₹33,253.55 crore in comparison to ₹37,542.88 crore. In Indian Ministry of Defence, “Demand no. 20: Capital Outlay on Defence Services”, … Continue reading Generally speaking, defence capital outlay in 2020-21 has declined since 2011-12: from representing 31.8 percent of total defence budget, it came to account for 24.1 per cent of the total defence budget (including defence pension).^[25]15^th Finance Commission, “Finance Commission in Covid Times: Report for 2021-2026”, Volume I, main report (October 2020), p.336. To a larger extent, while India’s defence budget has grown in absolute terms since the 1990s,^[26]India’s allocated defence budget for 2020-2021 amounted to $ 65.88 billion. the share of defence spending in the total government expenditure has decreased over the past few years.^[27]Abhishekh Bhalla, “India’s defence spending in terms of total govt expenditure for 2021-22 lowest in six years”, India Today, 17 March 2021, … Continue reading

India has also extended defence lines of credit for Vietnam ($500 million in 2016; $100 million in 2020), Seychelles ($100 million in 2018), Mauritius ($100 million in 2021) and Bangladesh ($500 million in 2021).

At the economic level, India has developed cooperative arrangements in building infrastructure with Japan, ranging from the mega-project for an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to smaller initiatives in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the Indian Navy has developed its reach and activities in the region in three ways. Firstly, through capacity building and humanitarian assistance initiatives. In May 2020, it launched its Mission SAGAR to deliver Covid-related assistance to the island states of the Indo-Pacific and, in November 2020, Mission SAGAR-II delivered food aid to African states. Secondly, by aiming to create Maritime Domain Awareness and expand its presence across this domain.^[28]Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theatre of Opportunity”, 2020. In 2014, it launched the Information Management and Analysis Centre and, in 2018, it set up an Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region, which began compiling maritime data with partners in 2019.^[29]Dinakar Peri, “India starts sharing maritime data”, The Hindu, 6 October 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-starts-sharing-maritime-data/article29611936.ece Thirdly, and to a larger extent, the Navy has built partnerships in the region through training exercise and in conducting goodwill mission and taking part in joint naval exercises with partner countries.

At the multilateral level, since 2008, India has sought to promote collective security through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.^[30]“Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shanri-la Dialogue”, 1 June 2018. In 2019, at the East Asia Summit, Narendra Modi has suggested the launching of an “Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative” “to create a safe, secure and stable maritime domain”.^[31]Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister’s Speech at the East Asia Summit”, 4 November 2019, … Continue reading India is also a part of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia that entered into force in 2006.

Partnerships

Partnerships with partner countries are central to India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. They provide additional economic and military resources to New Delhi to address the challenge of a changing strategic environment and enable it to coordinate a response.

Primary partners

India’s partnerships are based on multi-layered, issue-based cooperation with regional powers and countries. Its primary partners are the United States, Japan, Australia, countries with which India has annual 2+2 Dialogues, and France, with which it holds an annual defence dialogue.

For India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an informal security dialogue initially established in 2007 was revived in 2017 and has become a key grouping in the Indo-Pacific. On March 12, 2021, the first-ever leader-level summit of the Quad resulted in a communiqué that echoed Narendra Modi’s 2018 speech by supporting “the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity”.^[32]“Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, The White House briefing room, 12 March 2021, … Continue reading

With Quad and non-Quad countries, India’s partnership has found expression in military naval exercises with the US, Australia and, since 2015, Japan (the Malabar joint-manoeuvres^[33]For details, see the website of the Indian Navy: https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/node/27125 ) as well as with France and Australia (the Varuna exercises^[34]“France, India begin ‘Varuna’ naval exercise off Goa coast”, The Economic Times, 1 May 2019, … Continue reading ).

India is part of other mini-lateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific, including the Trilateral Dialogue with France and Australia since 2020,^[35]Ministry for Europe and External Affairs, Government of France, “The Indo-Pacific: 1st Trilateral Dialogue between France, India and Australia (9 September 2020)”, … Continue reading with Japan and the United States since 2018, and with Australia and Indonesia since 2017. ^[36]Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, “The first Indonesia-Australia-India Senior Officials’ Strategic Dialogue, Bogor, Indonesia”, 28 November 2017, … Continue reading

India has signed logistical exchange agreements on military facilities access with the US and France, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea.

Other regional partners

India has developed cooperation with other countries in the region, including:

• Indonesia: with which it concluded a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and a Common Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific;
• Singapore;
• The ASEAN: the 2020 ASEAN-India summit saw the adoption of a new ASEAN-India Plan of Action for 2021-2025. Modi announced that India would contribute with $1 million to the Covid-19 ASEAN Response Fund;
• The European Union, which adopted a new EU Strategy on India in December 2018, and which New Delhi sees as an important partner with which to strenghten cooperation in the region;
• The United Kingdom, in the context of the UK’s post-Brexit Indo-Pacific “tilt”;
• The island states of the Indian Ocean primarily, but also of the Pacific and the Caribbean;
• African states, in particular those bordering the Western Indian Ocean with which New Delhi has opened new diplomatic missions;
• New-Zealand: in May 2021, the two countries agreed to enhance their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region;
• Saudi Arabia and the UAE;
• Israël, which S. Jaishankar has described as part of India’s extended neighborhood and with which India discuss the Indo-Pacific.^[37]“Jaishankar asks Israeli diplomats to keep ‘forward and upward trajectory’ in bilateral ties”, The Times of India, 2 March 2021, … Continue reading

New Delhi also considers that Russia is a power of the Indo-Pacific, and has reportedly told Moscow that it should join the Indo-Pacific framework.^[38]Nayanima Basu, “India wants Russia to join Indo-Pacific initiative to signal it’s not just a US-centric plan”, The Print, 28 July 2020, … Continue reading

“Plurilateralism” and ambivalence vis-à-vis China

If the Quad and the Trilateral Dialogue are compatible, the way India considers “Russia as an Indo-Pacific power”^[39]Cleo Paskal, “Indo-Pacific strategies, perceptions and partnerships. The view from seven countries”, Chatham House Research Paper, March 2021, p.28, … Continue reading reflects a unique viewpoint that the present Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar defines as “plurilateralism”.^[40]Jaishankar defines “plurilateralism” in a concrete manner when he writes: “It is time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw … Continue reading While some Indian experts argue that New Delhi should continue its rapprochement with the West, and even initiate a dialogue with NATO,^[41]Rajah Mohan, “Why India must not say ‘no’ to NATO”, The Indian Express, 6 April 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/why-india-must-not-say-no-to-nato-7260435/. the Indian diplomatic community is not prepared to take sides. This ambivalent attitude might have an impact on the cohesiveness of the Quad.

All the more so as India is not prepared to antagonize China either. In fact Jaishankar claims that “The ability of India and China to work together could determine the Asian century”.^[42]Jaishankar, The India Way, op. cit., p.133

Along similar lines, in his 2018 Shangri-La speech, Narendra Modi expressed his opposition to “great power rivalries”, stating instead that the “Asia of cooperation will shape this century”.^[43]“Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shanri-la Dialogue”, 1 June 2018. He also stressed that India’s “friendships are not alliances of containment”,^[44]Ibid. indicating that New Delhi does not want to be seen as part of a containment effort vis-à-vis China. India’s attitude vis-à-vis China has clear affinities with the European view of the Indo-Pacific, a concept that France, Germany and the EU characterize as a “third way” between China and the US. Yet, whether Beijing’s policy vis-à-vis India will be sufficiently accommodating for ambivalence to remain the order of the day remains to be seen.