

To what extent is the Indo-Pacific the battleground of a new Cold War between the United States and China?

The « pivot to Asia », announced by Barack Obama in 2011, had given concrete form to this new American strategic priority, which was now concerned with containing Chinese power. The economic and military dynamics have made this zone the new center of gravity of international relations. We have thus moved from the « Asia-Pacific », which designated a region, to the « Indo-Pacific », which defines a strategic framework. Since its popularization in 2007 by Shinzo Abe, the concept of the Indo-Pacific has covered various realities and geographical definitions in the eyes of very different actors. Nevertheless, the development of numerous state strategies linked to this neologism for more than ten years underlines its importance and its power of attraction. Gradually, the Indo-Pacific became the new theater for competition between the US and China. China is now competing with the American power and is displaying its ambitions by claiming territories (China Sea, Taiwan), by developing the BRI to strengthen its economy and by extending its influence over the micro-states of the Pacific. Faced with this, the United States feels threatened and relies on its allies in the region to curb Chinese power. The United States and China imprint on the region the undeniable local mark of a new bipolarity and the Cold War sentiments and terminology are back in the spotlight. Thus we can ask ourselves: to what extent is the Indo-Pacific the battleground of a new Cold War between the United States and China?

First I will present the reasons why the Indo-Pacific is at the heart of every covetousness. Then I will demonstrate the emergent Cold War logic between the US and China that is shaping in the Indo-Pacific. Finally I will underline the limits of this terminology, and the factors that more likely tend to characterize this confrontation as a « competitive coexistence » rather than a « new Cold War ».

I- The Indo-Pacific, an indispensable marker of power

Increased economic activity and geopolitical and military competition in this vast ocean area are seen as the driving force behind the conceptualization of the Indopacific as a distinct region¹, and the motivations behind China and the US's competition for power.

A) A coveted strategic area:

The Indo-Pacific is nowadays fundamental for the global economy as it became in the past years a pivot of world growth. Encompassing 40 economies and \$47.19 trillion in economic activity², it is the fastest growing economic region in the world. With many of the world's largest economies (three of the world's largest economies—the People's Republic of China (China), India and Japan—are in this part of the world). Indeed, the region accounts for 60% of the world economy (world GDP) and two-thirds of all economic growth over the last five years³. As the gateway to world trade, through which a quarter of the world's goods and half of the world's oil transit, the Indo-Pacific zone is by nature a space with transnational issues⁴. Indeed, it is a key region for trade route and it encompasses sea lines of communication that have become key to global trade. The Indo-Pacific's resources are also highly coveted. In terms of energy, 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and natural gas reserves lie in South China Sea. Finally, the Indo-Pacific is home to 65% of the world's population and by 2030, the overwhelming majority (90%) of the 2.4 billion new members of the middle class entering the global economy will live in this region⁵. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific became the global center of economic dynamics, but also an indispensable marker in the International arena, judging by the number of states that have joined. Indeed, Japan, Australia, and India, the United States first spoke out on an Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017, before being followed by France, several European states -as well as the European Union (EU)- and other countries such as South Korea and, most recently, Canada⁶. As stated by Marine de Guglielmo⁷, it looks like the Indo-Pacific has become the obligatory point of passage for a new Asian diplomacy in search of influence and a strong status on the international scene.

B) Security priority

Given the stakes at play in this region, tensions over territorial claims and armament are numerous. All major powers want to assert its military presence to defend their interests, thus reshaping the geopolitical equilibrium and threatening confrontations that would have a global repercussions on international security. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific, which is already home to four states that possess nuclear weapons (China, India, North Korea and Pakistan), has become a highly militarized region with a continuous and worrying regional arms race. Regarding China, it has significantly modernized its armed forces over the past 30 years, driven by a steadily expanding defense budget that reached \$207 billion in 2021, accounting for 42.5 percent of Indo-Pacific military spending, compared with 10.1 percent for Japan and 9.6 percent for South Korea, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.⁸ On top of that, in early 2023, Japan released its first security document in a decade and decided to acquire an offensive strike capability. Therefore by 2028, the country intends to spend 313 billion dollars to increase its defence capabilities, bringing the country's spending in this area to 2% of itsGDP⁹. Recently, we can also note the acquisition of nuclear submarines by Australia through the AUKUS agreement.

¹ de Guglielmo, Marine. «Asie : Le Nouveau Continent Pivot ?» *IRIS*, 4 Mar. 2023, <https://www.iris-france.org/173543-asie-le-nouveau-continent-pivot/>.

² Canada, Global Affairs. «Government of Canada.» *GAC*, 10 Jan. 2023, www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng#a1_1.

³ Hugo Meijer power point on « Confronting China's rise: The US Indo-Pacific strategy and regional alliance dynamics »

⁴ de Villepin, Dominique. « L'Indo-Pacifique à la croisée des puissances », *Revue Défense Nationale*, vol. 812, no. 7, 2018, pp. 13-20.

⁵ Canada, Global Affairs. «Government of Canada.» *GAC*, 10 Jan. 2023, www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng#a1_1.

⁶ Courmont, Barthélemy, Éric Mottet, et Marianne Péron-Doise. « L'Indo-Pacifique, des visions plurielles entre convergences et dissonances », *Revue internationale et stratégique*, vol. 129, no. 1, 2023, pp. 35-39.

⁷ de Guglielmo, Marine. «Asie : Le Nouveau Continent Pivot ?» *IRIS*, 4 Mar. 2023, <https://www.iris-france.org/173543-asie-le-nouveau-continent-pivot/>.

⁸ Faton, Lionel. «Vers Une Nouvelle Ère de Militarisation (et d'instabilité ?) En Indo-Pacifique.» *Le Rubicon*, 12 Aug. 2022, lerubicon.org/publication/vers-une-nouvelle-ere-de-militarisation-et-dinstabilite-en-indo-pacifique/.

⁹ Frachon, Alain. « Face à La Chine, Les Pays de l'Indo-Pacifique Se Réarment et Se Rapprochent Des Etats-Unis. » *Le Monde.Fr*, 26 Jan. 2023, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/01/26/face-a-la-chine-les-pays-de-l-indo-pacifique-se-rearment-et-se-rapprochent-des-etats-unis_6159370_3232.html.

This arms race is occurring in a tensed geopolitical equilibrium with numerous territorial conflicts looming over the region. In the past years, China has taken a more aggressive stance on the regional scene, where it has territorial disputes with a dozen countries, and is expanding its influence in the Pacific. On top of that, China's increasing military pressure on Taiwan, as well as its increasing military maneuvers such as the ones in August 2022, are of particular concern to the United States and its allies.¹⁰ In the South China Sea, China is claiming, in the name of history, and from now on by fait accompli, 90% of the South China¹¹ Sea while Indonesians, Japanese, Malaysians, Filipinos and Vietnamese are complaining of renewed aggression around disputed islands, islets and fishing grounds¹². As a result, this overlap of military spheres of influence compromise a regional stability already weakened by multiple territorial, political and historical tensions¹³.

II-A Cold War logic between the US and China:

According to American political scientists Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis, "it is no longer debatable that the U.S. and China... are entering their own new Cold War. Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared it, and a rare bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress has accepted the challenge."¹⁴ A cold war is defined as a « condition of rivalry, mistrust, and often open hostility short of violence,» generally applying to two global powers locked in an escalating rivalry across multiple domains—economics, technology, diplomacy, geopolitics—but absent direct military conflict¹⁵ and usually refers to the period of geopolitical tension between the US and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1991. It is in this perspective that the US National Defense Strategy (2018) emphasizes a return to the Cold War mentality of great power competition¹⁶ and that we will try to assert to which extent the confrontation between the US and China falls within this dynamic.

A) Networked security architecture and military alliances

One key illustrative element of this Cold War logic in the Indo-Pacific is the US networked security architecture of alliances and the QUAD perceived as a NATO-like alliance to contain the inevitable rise of China. Indeed, the US has Indo-Pacific alliances with Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand¹⁷ and the renewal of its system of alliances to this new dynamic. As explained by Hugo Meijer: « The so-called "hub-and-spokes" system of bilateral alliances has been gradually supplemented by a "networked security architecture"—a network of interwoven bilateral, minilateral and multilateral defence arrangements between the US and its regional allies and partners »¹⁸ in which U.S. and allied capabilities, as well as allied capabilities among themselves, would be interconnected for greater efficiency. Thus, in order to allow them to become more involved, the United States is increasing its support for the strengthening of the armies of South Korea, Japan and Australia, the main partners in the region. More importantly, Washington is gradually lifting its veto on sensitive weapons programs, which allow for increased military power projection by the allies, at the risk of destabilizing the regional architecture¹⁹. For instance, according to Dr Poonkham Jittipat, « AUKUS is the latest minilateral security arrangement and it illustrates the twofold aims of the US in the Indo-Pacific: to constrain the rising China and to sustain American preponderance of power in the region. However, AUKUS is seen by the Chinese as part of a new containment strategy »²⁰. Another minilateral alliance, the QUAD (involving Australia, India, Japan, and the US) has been even perceived as a NATO-like alliance directly directed at containing China²¹, qualified by the latter as the "mini-NATO" or an "Asian NATO" and as the "embodiment of the US-propagated selective multilateral (collective) security system"²². Finally, the military expenditures by the US and China, which could account for two-thirds of global military spending by 2050, as the US defense budget reaches \$800 billion and the Chinese one \$300 billion whereas no other global power will spend more than \$80 billion on its forces²³.

¹⁰ Fatton, Lionel. "Vers Une Nouvelle Ère de Militarisation (et d'instabilité ?) En Indo-Pacifique." *Le Rubicon*, 12 Aug. 2022, lerubicon.org/publication/vers-une-nouvelle-ere-de-militarisation-et-dinstabilite-en-indo-pacifique/.

¹¹ de Villepin, Dominique. « L'Indo-Pacifique à la croisée des puissances », *Revue Défense Nationale*, vol. 812, no. 7, 2018, pp. 13-20.

¹² Frachon, Alain. "Face à La Chine, Les Pays de l'Indo-Pacifique Se Réarment et Se Rapprochent Des Etats-Unis ." *Le Monde.Fr*, 26 Jan. 2023, www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/01/26/face-a-la-chine-les-pays-de-l-indo-pacifique-se-rearment-et-se-rapprochent-des-etats-unis_6159370_3232.html.

¹³ Fatton, Lionel. "Vers Une Nouvelle Ère de Militarisation (et d'instabilité ?) En Indo-Pacifique." *Le Rubicon*, 12 Aug. 2022, lerubicon.org/publication/vers-une-nouvelle-ere-de-militarisation-et-dinstabilite-en-indo-pacifique/.

¹⁴ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "The New Cold War That Threatens to Turn Hot." *Jamestown*, 20 Mar. 2023, jamestown.org/program/the-new-cold-war-that-threatens-to-turn-hot/.

¹⁵ Harding, Andrew. "America Is in a New Cold War with China." *The Heritage Foundation*, www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/america-new-cold-war-china.

¹⁶ Doyle, Timothy, and Dennis Rumley. *The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific*, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sciences-po/detail.action?docID=6121954>.

¹⁷ Idem

¹⁸ Meijer, H. Shaping China's rise: the reordering of US alliances and defence partnerships in East Asia. *Int Polit* 57, 166–184 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00201-y>

¹⁹ Fatton, Lionel. "Vers Une Nouvelle Ère de Militarisation (et d'instabilité ?) En Indo-Pacifique." *Le Rubicon*, 12 Aug. 2022, lerubicon.org/publication/vers-une-nouvelle-ere-de-militarisation-et-dinstabilite-en-indo-pacifique/.

²⁰ Poonkham, Jittipat. *The Indo-Pacific: A Global Region of Geopolitical Struggle*, image.mfa.go.th/mfa/0/4OJCTby7gE/2-2022_Jan2022_Indo-Pacific_Jittipat.pdf.

²¹ Doyle, Timothy, and Dennis Rumley. *The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific*, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sciences-po/detail.action?docID=6121954>.

²² Panda, Jagannath. "China, the Indo-Pacific and NATO: Staying Relevant in a Shifting World Order." *ISPI*, 9 Dec. 2022, www.ispionline.it/en/publication/china-indo-pacific-and-nato-staying-relevant-shifting-world-order-35565.

²³ Xuetong, Yan. "The Age of Uneasy Peace." *Foreign Affairs*, 17 Feb. 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/age-uneas>

B) Ideology and zone of influence

An other essential element that can be interpreted interpreted within the framework of a Cold War 'logic' is the competition for the spread of influence, and even to a certain extent ideology, between the US and China. Indeed, throughout the region, the two powers compete in seducing or pressuring states to join their cause and integrate them into their zone of influence. Regarding China, the most relevant exemple is the implementation of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) in 2013 which proposes a global strategy focused on connectivity and the construction of infrastructures whose main route is in the Indo-Pacific area²⁴. Other exemples could be the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Mekong-Lancang cooperation channel, seeking to bypass US-led global institutions and rewrite the global order²⁵. In order to counter this Chinese projection of power, the US creation of the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) at the initiative of the US is a good exemple of the re-engaging the Biden administration's position to rebalance the games of influence in the region by standardizing local governance on a Western model²⁶.

In addition to this competition for the areas of influence, we can also notice competing ideologies between the two blocs. Indeed, the US promote a « free and open Indo-Pacific » as the the pioneering front of liberal democracy against the rise of authoritarian regimes in Asia. Indeed, the US increasingly expands democracy promotion, human rights, liberal economy and freedom of navigation²⁷ while reviving Cold War rhetoric and calling for the collective resistance of a « free world ». In response, deliberately playing the card of a post-Western world, Beijing denounced past humiliations and insisted that Asia belonged to the Asian powers²⁸.

III- Towards a « competitive coexistence »: a different type of confrontation

Nevertheless, despite the growing intensity of US-China relations, the idea that a “new Cold War” has begun is misguided. ²⁹ Indeed, there are several parameters that prevent the Sino-American rivalry from fully turning into a new cold war. Indeed, the actual international system is increasingly defined by multipolar, not bipolar, organisational units. While the US and China are the biggest players in Asia, both in terms of military expenditure and GDP, they are by no means the only ones with influence³⁰. Therefore, the global economic interdependency and the refusal of regional states to be trapped in opposing blocs are two major parameters that indicate a different type of confrontation than the Cold War logic.

A) An economic interdependency with no ideological competition:

Indeed, this confrontation is different in that it is taking place in an era of increased globalization and thus economic interdependency³¹. The interdependence of the two players is also incomparable to past situations, primarily in terms of trade, with more than 600 billion dollars exchanged each year, but also in terms of technology³². As demonstrated by Doyle, « out of the four perceived potential adversaries of the US (China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia), China is the state with which the US believes that it has the greatest level of mutual interest »³³. But this factor is particularly relevant to understand China's position. Indeed, as China's economic transformation was built on export China and relies on a global network of trade ties, to the point that it was the foremost trading partner of more than 120 countries in 2022³⁴, a liberal economic order built on free trade is one of China's top priorities³⁵. Therefore, the access to foreign markets is crucial for Beijing. Thus it is not in its interest to enter in confrontation with the US or its close allies³⁶ with the risk to cut off its access to US influence markets and important economic partnerships. China might rather focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country's continued economic growth³⁷. Therefore, as explained by Bekkevold, « China's high level of interdependence with the world economy is the very reason why some observers prefer to use labels other than “cold war” when describing the U.S.-China bipolar system—suggesting terms such as competitive coexistence, cold coexistence, or conflictual coexistence.”³⁸ Nevertheless, it is important to note that the two powers are aware of this interdependency and are trying to reduce it as they perceive it as a vulnerability.

²⁴ Péron-Doise, Marianne. “L’Indo-Pacifique Au Cœur Des Mutations Du Système International.” *IRIS*, 2 May 2023, www.iris-france.org/173612-lindo-pacifique-au-coeur-des-mutations-du-systeme-international/.

²⁵ Poonkham, Jittipat. *The Indo-Pacific: A Global Region of Geopolitical Struggle*, image.mfa.go.th/mfa/0/4OJCTby7gE/2-2022_Jan2022_Indo-Pacific_Jittipat.pdf.

²⁶ El Hadj Saïd, Othman, and Yanis Gras. “Rivalités Dans l’indopacifique : Les États-Unis à La Reconquête de Leur Influence Face à La Chine.” *Portail de l’IE*, 9 May 2023, www.portail-ie.fr/univers/influence-lobbying-et-guerre-de-linformation/2022/rivalites-dans-lindopacifique-les-etats-unis-a-la-reconquete-de-leur-influence-face-a-la-chine/.

²⁷ Jittipat, Poonkham. *The Indo-Pacific: A Global Region of Geopolitical Struggle*, image.mfa.go.th/mfa/0/4OJCTby7gE/2-2022_Jan2022_Indo-Pacific_Jittipat.pdf.

²⁸ Lanxade, Jacques. « La confrontation entre États-Unis et Chine : déstabilisation de l’Indo-Pacifique », *Revue Défense Nationale*, vol. 844, no. 9, 2021, pp. 9-14.

²⁹ Skinner, Jackson, et al. “On the ‘New Cold War’ Commentary in US-China Strategic Competition.” *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, 24 Jan. 2023, www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/on-the-new-cold-war-commentary-in-us-china-strategic-competition/.

³⁰ Idem

³¹ Doyle, Timothy, and Dennis Rumley. *The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific*, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sciences-po/detail.action?docID=6121954>.

³² de Villepin, Dominique. « L’Indo-Pacifique à la croisée des puissances », *Revue Défense Nationale*, vol. 812, no. 7, 2018, pp. 13-20.

³³ Doyle, Timothy, and Dennis Rumley. *The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific*, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sciences-po/detail.action?docID=6121954>.

³⁴ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. “The New Cold War That Threatens to Turn Hot.” *Jamestown*, 20 Mar. 2023, jamestown.org/program/the-new-cold-war-that-threatens-to-turn-hot/.

³⁵ Xuetong, Yan. “The Age of Uneasy Peace.” *Foreign Affairs*, 17 Feb. 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/age-uneas>

³⁶ Xuetong, Yan. “The Age of Uneasy Peace.” *Foreign Affairs*, 17 Feb. 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/age-uneas>

³⁷ Idem

³⁸ Bekkevold, Jo Inge. “5 Ways the U.S.-China Cold War Will Be Different from the Last One.” *Foreign Policy*, 29 Dec. 2022, foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/29/us-china-cold-war-bipolar-global-order-stability-biden-xi/.

As a result, rather than entering a « new Cold War » era, the coming bipolarity will more likely be « an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers ».³⁹ Xuetong predicts that « both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the economic and technological realms ».⁴⁰

Finally, it is important to note that this economic interdependency also undermines the ideological factor mentioned previously. Indeed, a mistake of U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific is to apply a readjustment of U.S. Cold War policy to the Sino-American strategic rivalry by trying to coalesce a large part of the countries in the area in the name of the struggle for democracy⁴¹. However, they somehow seem not to have fully realized the magnitude of China's regional economic footprint relative to that of the United States.

As a result, the « U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property »⁴².

B) A two track foreign policy

At last but not least, a very distinct element from the cold war that prevents characterizing the Sino-American rivalry from being labelled as a « Cold War » is the two track foreign policy adopted by most states in the Indo-Pacific, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others rather than aligning behind one of the two blocs.

Many countries in the region are worried about getting caught in between the two powers and being forced to take side⁴³. Nevertheless, these countries understand that they can actually turn this situation of power competition to their advantage by working with the highest bidder on specific areas but also by reinforcing non aligned regional institutions. For instance, many western allies like Australia or Japan are developing military ties with the US and closely aligned with them on traditional security matters (AUKUS, QUAD...) while maintaining economic cooperation with China (China is Australia's first economic partner). An opinion survey, conducted by SEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in February 2022, reveals that ASEAN member states continue to prioritize building resilience and unity in the regional organization (46.1%). This is to limit pressure from the two major powers. The traditional option of not choosing between the United States and China is relegated to second place (26.6%), while alignment with either great power receives only 11.1% of responses⁴⁴. As a result, unlike during the Cold War between the US and the USSR, the new US-China bipolar world « will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines »⁴⁵.

In conclusion, although the Indo-Pacific is the privileged theater of Sino-American rivalry and cold war rhetoric by concentrating all of its stakes from an economic, diplomatic and military standpoint, as illustrated by the growing military alliances and expenditures, as well as the competition for influence across the region, the idea that a “new Cold War” has begun is misguided. Indeed, several parameters that prevent the Sino-American rivalry from fully turning into a new cold war, notably China's high level of interdependence with the world economy and the two track foreign policy adopted by most states in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, framing of US-China rivalry as a new Cold War would be a “strategic mistake of fighting tomorrow's war with yesterday's strategies” (Kishore Mahbubani)⁴⁶. As Henry Kissinger recently put it, the world is entering a new era in which leadership in the Indo-Pacific can neither be provided by China nor by the United States. The region is moving more toward a model of “dynamic bipolarity” than a return to the Cold War⁴⁷.

Word count: 4928

³⁹ Xuetong, Yan. “The Age of Uneasy Peace.” *Foreign Affairs*, 17 Feb. 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/age-uneas>

⁴⁰ Idem

⁴¹ El Hadj Saïd, Othman, and Yanis Gras. “Rivalités Dans l'indopacifique : Les États-Unis à La Reconquête de Leur Influence Face à La Chine.” *Portail de l'IE*, 9 May 2023, www.portail-ie.fr/univers/influence-lobbying-et-guerre-de-linformation/2022/rivalites-dans-lindopacifique-les-etats-unis-a-la-reconquete-de-leur-influence-face-a-la-chine/.

⁴² Xuetong, Yan. “The Age of Uneasy Peace.” *Foreign Affairs*, 17 Feb. 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/age-uneas>

⁴³ Tisdall, Simon. “In New Battle for the Pacific, US and China Force Regional States to Take Sides | Simon Tisdall.” *The Guardian*, 7 May 2023, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/07/in-new-battle-for-the-pacific-us-and-china-force-regional-states-to-take-sides.

⁴⁴ El Hadj Saïd, Othman, and Yanis Gras. “Rivalités Dans l'indopacifique : Les États-Unis à La Reconquête de Leur Influence Face à La Chine.” *Portail de l'IE*, 9 May 2023, www.portail-ie.fr/univers/influence-lobbying-et-guerre-de-linformation/2022/rivalites-dans-lindopacifique-les-etats-unis-a-la-reconquete-de-leur-influence-face-a-la-chine/.

⁴⁵ Xuetong, Yan. “The Age of Uneasy Peace.” *Foreign Affairs*, 17 Feb. 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/age-uneas>

⁴⁶ Jittipat, Poonkham. *The Indo-Pacific: A Global Region of Geopolitical Struggle*, image.mfa.go.th/mfa/0/4OJCTby7gE/2-2022_Jan2022_Indo-Pacific_Jittipat.pdf.

⁴⁷ El Hadj Saïd, Othman, and Yanis Gras. “Rivalités Dans l'indopacifique : Les États-Unis à La Reconquête de Leur Influence Face à La Chine.” *Portail de l'IE*, 9 May 2023, www.portail-ie.fr/univers/influence-lobbying-et-guerre-de-linformation/2022/rivalites-dans-lindopacifique-les-etats-unis-a-la-reconquete-de-leur-influence-face-a-la-chine/.

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