Four insights on the Major Turmoil for French Democracy

Researchers offer their analyses to shed light on the results of our latest Political Trust Barometer.

Major Turmoil for French Democracy

Bruno Cautrès, CNRS-affiliated researcher at CEVIPOF, Lecturer at Sciences Po

When concluding the Grand débat national on April 25, 2019, Emmanuel Macron declared: “From what I understand, the feeling of many of our fellow citizens is along the lines of: 'you've asked US to make changes but you yourselves have changed very little. The same people are still there, organized in the same way they’ve always been, we have seen no change whatsoever. And I have to say, that is true. So, in terms of democracy, citizens want to be better represented, to participate more, to benefit from more effective organization. We've seen a lot of debate about this, and I'd like to say, quite clearly, where I stand after having done a lot of listening and a lot of thinking. I believe in elected representatives”. While the President declared that he wanted to revitalize French political life by “revivifying democratic practice” (rather than through direct democracy such as RIC* , compulsory voting or recognition of the blank vote as an actual vote), his words echoed many previous statements on democracy in France.

More than seven years after his first election, and more than five years after the “Grand débat national”, the President's grand plan to restore French people's trust in their democratic system has not worked.
Wave 16 of the Political Trust Barometer shows that France is very dissatisfied with its democratic system: only 28% of respondents believe that democracy works well in France, similar to the lowest percentages observed in the CEVIPOF survey for 16 years (27% at the time of the Gilets jaunes crisis in December 2018). This dissatisfaction affects very many categories of the population, but reaches very high levels among the oldest, the least well- educated, residents of rural communes or medium-sized towns, employees and blue-collar workers. Only 21% of Jean-Luc Mélenchon voters feel that democracy works well in France,17% of Marine Le Pen voters and 10% of Éric Zemmour voters.
 

A comparison with other European neighbors speaks volumes about the image of a France mired in a deep sense of democratic malaise: in Italy, 37% consider democracy to be working well, compared with 45% in the Netherlands and 51% in Germany. Other worrying signs of democratic malaise in France, and indeed of a profound democratic fracture, are expressed in the survey: 54% say “there's nothing to be proud of about our democratic system” (42% in Italy, 33% in Germany and 31% in the Netherlands), 34% that “politicians don't deserve much respect” (28% in Germany, 26% in the Netherlands). Only 24% believe that “politicians try to keep their campaign promises”, a figure down on last year (-4 points) and significantly lower than in Germany (30%) or the Netherlands (41%).

Wave 16 of the Political Trust Barometer reflects a form of democratic turmoil in France. This is made up of a mixture of dissatisfaction, anger and incomprehension of the situation, 1 Referendum by citizen initiative fueling worrying demands for authority in the name of effectiveness. Never before has the proportion of those who believe “that in a democracy nothing advances, and that it would be better for it to be less democratic but more effective” been so high: 48%, or almost one French citizen in two. Today, particularly when compared with Germany, the Netherlands and indeed Italy which has faced many crises within its democratic system, France seems more than ever to be calling for a profound renewal of democracy.

* Referendum by citizen initiative

Political Mistrust at the Highest Level While the Local Level Holds Up

Flora Chanvril, Research Engineer, CEVIPOF

The 2025 edition of the Barometer shows a clear increase in political mistrust: 74% of respondents have no trust in politics (+4 points compared to 2024). This deterioration affects certain groups in particular: 82% of people declaring themselves to identify with the radical right, 87% of RN sympathizers who do not identify with any party, as well as 80% of those finding it very difficult to get by on their income, and 79% of 50- to 64-year-olds. These gaps are found on almost all indicators.

This crisis in trust is part of a wider dynamic: 83% feel that politicians do not care about ordinary citizens (+2 points), and 71% feel that democracy functions poorly (+3 points). The perception of corrupt political personnel rises to 74% (+6 points), returning to its 2016 level. 

National and supranational institutions are particularly affected. Trust in the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister falls to 23% (-6 points) and 27% (-8 points), placing the head of government behind MEPs. Trust in political parties falls to 16% (-4 points), continuing a long-term trend. Trust in the French National Assembly also falls (24%, -5 points), while trust in elected representatives remains stable at 40% (+1 point) underlining the importance of their local roots. 

In this tense climate, the local level retains a certain degree of trust. The mayor remains the most trusted political figure (61% trust, +1 point). In the face of institutional mistrust, political figures perceived as accessible and involved in day-to-day management retain their legitimacy. 

Certain state-level institutions and socio-economic players continue to enjoy a favorable image. The gendarmerie, the army, SMEs and craftworkers, for example, have trust ratings of around 80% or more, well above those of political institutions. 

These deep- seated tensions in French society illustrate a marked duality. The feeling of fatigue, which now stands at 40% (+4 points), behind mistrust at 45%, and ahead of gloom (30%) and fear (18%), illustrates this growing fatigue with democracy. France stands out clearly from the rest of Europe: in Germany, serenity dominates (33%), ahead of mistrust (25%); in Italy, fatigue and mistrust remain more moderate (31%), ahead of serenity (26%); in the Netherlands, trust (31%) and well-being (27%) are far ahead. 

In the French context, the resilience of local players and certain non-political institutions could provide a springboard for restoring democratic trust. However, without effective policy responses, the gap between citizens and national institutions is likely to widen, posing a major challenge to the country's governance and social cohesion.

A Crisis of Legitimacy for the Bayrou Coalition

Damien Bol, Lecturer-Research Fellow, CEVIPOF

Ever since the 2024 French legislative election, it has been difficult to maintain a government in place given the absence of a political group with an absolute majority in Parliament. The current government thus differs from most governments of the Fifth Republic in that it is a coalition between the Ensemble group and Les Républicains (LR) and is not supported by a political majority. 

The question arises as to whether such a context has any impact on the French public's perception of the Bayrou government's legitimacy. It would appear so: only 32% of respondents consider the government to be legitimate. Unsurprisingly, Ensemble voters see François Bayrou's government as the most legitimate (69%), while
Rassemblement National (RN) and Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) voters see it as the least legitimate (17% and 25% respectively). Even among LR voters, who are formally part of this government coalition, 53% dispute its legitimacy. 

In order to estimate the effect of communication on the composition of the government and its electoral support, we carried out an experiment among two random sub-samples of respondents. We submitted a short text placed before the question to respondents about the legitimacy of the government. The text reminded respondents either of the electoral score obtained by the formation leading the government, or the electoral score obtained by the government coalition as a whole.

The result showed that when respondents are reminded that the government is led by the Ensemble group, which received 20% of the vote in the first round and 23% of the vote in the second round of the 2024 election, recognition of legitimacy rises slightly (33%, +1 point). However, this average masks differences between groups of voters. Reminding respondents of the figures substantially increases the perceived legitimacy of the government among Ensemble (78%, +9 points) and Les Républicains (54%, +7 points) voters. However, it decreases the perceived legitimacy of the government among voters from opposition parties, particularly the RN (15%, -2 points). 

When they are reminded that this government is in fact a coalition between Ensemble and Les Républicains, who collectively won over a quarter of the vote in the first round and almost a third in the second round of the elections, this perceived legitimacy declines further (29%, -3 points). Once again, the average masks major differences between electorates: perceived legitimacy is higher among LR voters (59%, +12 points), while the opposite effect is observed among Ensemble voters (61%, -8  points), and opposition voters, particularly RN voters (13%, -5 points). 

These results show the importance of communication on the electoral score and the composition of the government, which can change the perceived legitimacy among the general population, particularly in a political system such as that of the Fifth Republic, where coalitions of political parties remain rare.

Authoritarian Pro-Business Philosophy Takes Hold in France

Luc Rouban, Senior CNRS-affiliated Research Fellow at the CEVIPOF

The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in November 2024 marks the arrival of a highly concentrated type of power, openly in favour of the most unbridled economic liberalism and claiming strong authority in an attempt to show itself to be particularly effective in resolving economic or international issues. 

Wave 16 of the Political Trust Barometer reveals that the quest for effective democracy is also particularly strong in France. Nearly one French citizen in two (48%) agrees with the idea that “in a democracy nothing advances, it's better to be less democratic and more effective”. This average does not change, irrespective of the level of trust in political institutions (government, National Assembly, Senate, city council, European Parliament) and irrespective of the age bracket. The level of education plays little part, with 56% of CAP** level respondents approving this proposition, compared to 42% of those with a higher education diploma. 

On the other hand, this call for effectiveness, to the detriment of democracy, increases linearly with the search for authority, measured here through an index constructed on the basis of three questions (a good political system is one with a strong man at its head who doesn't have to worry about elections or Parliament, where experts decide what is in the general interest, where the army runs the country). Only 26% of respondents at level 0 of the authority index seek effectiveness above all else, while this proportion rises to 83% among those at level 3 of the same index. 

Effectiveness and authority are strongly associated with the level of economic liberalism measured here by having trust in big business, wanting to reduce the number of civil servants and believing that the state should trust businesses rather than control them, all of which closely reflect Donald Trump's agenda. The economic liberalism index therefore ranges from 0 to 3 according to the number of positive responses and can be dichotomized between a low level (0 or 1 positive response) and a high level (2 or 3 positive responses). On average, 55% of respondents are at the upper end of the index. 

The more business-oriented a person is, the more that person seeks effectiveness (26% for the least liberal and 63% for the most liberal) and the more the person seeks authority (16% for the least liberal and 53% for the most liberal). Economic liberalism is no longer associated with political liberalism. In total, those who are strongly economically liberal and strongly authoritarian make up 26% of ll respondents. The survey shows that authoritarian liberals are very evenly distributed across all electorates in the first round of the 2024 legislative election, with the exception of the Nouveau Front Populaire (14%), with a greater presence within the Rassemblement National (35%) and particularly Reconquête! (49%), while those from Renaissance and LR remain at an average level (26% and 28% respectively). A quarter of abstainers (24%) are authoritarian economic liberals. The political equation that led to Donald Trump's election is thus well and truly present in France.

** In the French education system, the CAP Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle is a vocational qualification designed to allow the holder to access a specific trade.