Square Pegs and Round Holes: The Story of the Palestinian Political System

Presenter: Sanaa Alsarghali, Assistant Professor at An-Najah National University
Discussant: Guillaume Tusseau, Full Professor at Sciences Po Law School

This paper explores the controversial adoption of the semi-presidential system in Palestine. Originating from the Weimar Republic and later the French Fifth Republic, this system, in contrast to purely parliamentary or presidential models, features a popularly elected head of state and an appointed government head accountable to the legislature. The distinguishing feature is that the executive authority must be split between these two heads, each with its own power and legitimacy. The system has become very popular globally in recent decades.  While the system's design can take complex and hybrid forms in each case.  In Palestine, its implementation led to significant political challenges; some because of the particular design but others because of the basic nature of semipresidentialism. The paper indicates that despite its global popularity in helping troubled democracies, as once suggested by Giovanni Sartori, the semi-presidential system could also be responsible for creating troublesome situations.
 
The Palestinian case study reveals the complicated dynamics at play when implementing this system. Initially, having a semi-presidential system was a product not of domestic demands, but a confluence of domestic and international pressures that were aimed against a specific leader rather than a well-formed plan of political reform. In 2003, the Road Map Peace Agreement imposed a prime ministerial role on the parliamentary system that the transitional constitution (The Basic Law) had just put into constitutional form a year earlier. The aim was to mitigate the influence of then-President Yasser Arafat. This hastily adopted change, without adequate amendments to the Basic Law, resulted in ambiguities and tensions between the President and the appointed Prime Minister (Mahmoud Abbas) at the time, undermining the government's functioning. Designed for Arafat as president and Abbas as prime minister, the system quickly outlived their tenure in office.  The instability intensified following the 2006 elections, which saw Hamas' victory and the appointment of a Prime Minister from a party different from the President's Fatah party. The subsequent rejection of Hamas by the Israeli government, the international community, and Fatah party itself, led to an internal political schism between the government and the president, culminating in the political territorial division of the West Bank and Gaza in 2007. This left Palestine in a prolonged state of political suspension, without an active legislative council and a President resorting to presidential decrees for governance in the West Bank.
 
This paper presents a compelling argument that the unique Palestinian context, characterized by a lack of sovereignty due to Israeli occupation, illegal  Israeli settlements’ expansions, difficult financial situation that relies heavily on international aids, and the inexperienced political factions in governance among other factors created a tendency to amplify the inherent deadlock risks of the semi-presidential system which rendered this system in the way it was adopted unsuitable for Palestine at the time. In order to show how this argument is played out within the Palestinian context this paper will rely on Cindy Skach's analytical framework in categorizing the semi-presidential system into distinct subtypes: "Consolidated majority government," "cohabitation," and "consolidated minority government." This categorization aids in identifying the manifestation of these subtypes within the Palestinian political landscape between 2003 and 2007. Adopted for short-term reasons, the choice was both poorly designed and inappropriate for the long term; these flaws quickly became manifest in political practice.  The analysis highlights the intricate interplay among the President, Legislature, and Prime Minister that moved quickly from tension to breakdown during this period. Additionally, the paper identifies and discusses a novel fourth subtype that emerged post-2018, following the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council. This new subtype is marked by a propensity towards political gridlock, exacerbated by the absence of Palestinian legislative council. The study concludes by providing insightful recommendations for future constitutional frameworks. These suggestions aim to optimize the functionality of a semi-presidential system in Palestine, particularly in the context of future state-building initiatives post October 2023.

Invite-only event.

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