Analysing Azerbaijan: How Can a Secular State Manage a Revival of Religion?

Azerbaijan is a secular state. A genuine secularist movement was started in Azerbaijan in the mid-nineteenth century by the local Russian and European-educated intelligentsia. The greatest success of this movement was the creation of the first secular republic during the First World War and the Russian Revolution.

In 1920, the Red Army put an end to this republic. However, during Soviet rule the secularist traditions of Azerbaijani society strengthened further, even though, as I said earlier, the collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the impressive revival of religion. Soviet rule eradicated local sources of religious knowledge and because of this, in the 1990s, the revival was led primarily by foreign actors.

Then, in the late 1990s, local clerics educated abroad took the leading role in religious proselytism. This situation was unacceptable to Azerbaijani authorities, as they wanted religious learning to be concentrated in the hands of locally educated Muslim clerics. The authorities have been pursuing a policy of domesticating Islam. Unlike the Soviets, the current Azerbaijani government does not intend to get rid of religion; they instead want to make Islamic elites into loyal supporters of the secular system and ruling elite.

This policy has given birth to a complex religious situation in the country. On the one hand, there is an official Islam loyal to the government. On the other hand, there are Islamic communities that aim to exist without the secular state’s interference. The constitution says that the state and religion are separate; however, the real situation is much more complicated.

Both the government and independent Islamic communities complain about interference from their counterparts. Islamic communities complain that the state infringes on their freedom of conscience, while the government complains that independent communities are a threat to the secular nature of the state.

The Azerbaijani government aims to create distinct characteristics of local Islam which it describes as a “civilised” Islam. The methods used to achieve this goal include the implementation of a unique education programme for training Muslim clerics in the newly established Theological Institute, the adaptation of distinct uniforms for Azerbaijani Muslim clerics, the promotion of joint Sunni-Shi’i prayers, among other things.

“Correcting” rituals of Muharram commemorations are among the planned reforms. It should be noted that Muharram is the most popular religious commemoration in Azerbaijan. It has been for centuries. However, beginning in the early twentieth century, some practices of Muharram commemorations, such as self-flagellation or striking oneself with swords and knives, have been heavily criticised by the local secular intelligentsia as “uncivilised” rituals.

The Soviets launched multiple campaigns against Muharram observations like these and others. In the post-Soviet era, this approach has been continued, and some practices have been replaced with novelties, such as making blood donations instead of striking themselves with knives or self-flagellation with metal chains.

During the last decade, another government concern has been the increased pilgrimage of Azerbaijani believers to Shi’i shrines in Iraq and Iran at the end of annual Muharram commemorations. The government considers the rising number of pilgrims to those places as a security risk. So, by implementing various measures and restrictions, the authorities are trying to curb the number of pilgrims.

It is an interesting question. Azerbaijan, despite the impressive religious revival in the post-Soviet period, remains a largely secular country. So, most Azerbaijanis cherish their society’s secular characteristics and do not appreciate the interference of religion or religious communities in state affairs.

However, state institutions’ deep interference with the life of religious communities in many instances infringes on people’s freedom of conscience. And in this particular matter, there is a generational disruption within society. While the older Soviet-trained and educated part of the society, especially the urbanised part, is not particularly critical of the excesses of the government’s religious policies, the younger population, especially its quite vocal liberal and progressive representatives, despite appreciating and praising the secular fundamentals of the society, is frequently critical of the tough measures implemented by the government in the promotion of religious conformity.

It should also be added that ethnic nationalism is a strong feature of Azerbaijani society. And traditionally, secular nationalists have been critical of Islamic movements, and on this issue, they tend to align more with the government than Islamic communities.