A Tree for a Vote? Reelection incentives and deforestation cycles in Indonesia
A Tree for a Vote? Reelection incentives and deforestation cycles in Indonesia
- Picture by Rich Carey (via Shutterstock)
CRIS Scientific Seminar 2024-2025
Friday, January 10th 2025, 11:30 am
Sciences Po, Room François Goguel (27, Saint-Guillaume)
A Tree for a Vote? Reelection incentives and deforestation cycles in Indonesia
Julia Hélie
PhD Candidate, Paris School of Economics
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This study examines how reelection incentives influence politicians' decisions on deforestation, using Indonesian district-level panel data from 2005 to 2019 along with pixel-level environmental data.
By exploiting quasi-random election timing and term limits, the study isolates the impact of reelection incentives on deforestation.
The results show a significant increase in deforestation in the year leading up to an election, only when the incumbent is eligible for reelection. This effect is most pronounced in highly competitive political environments.
Furthermore, the study investigates the underlying mechanisms driving these reelection incentives effects, including alignment with the electorate and securing campaign funding.
Firstly, legal land use classification and post-deforestation land use are employed to identify beneficiaries and political motivations.
Subsequently, the study refines its analysis by examining fire-induced deforestation to assess sensitivity to more observable and local externalities.
Finally, by matching land permits and public procurement data with a unique campaign donations dataset, the study explores potential links between deforested areas and campaign donations.