This policy brief evaluates the theoretical justifications for the introduction of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and its relationship with competition policy, in particular with regard to abuse of dominance. This paper supports the introduction of novel forms of ex ante intervention based on a hybrid model between competition policy and regulation. It shows, however, that while this hybridity represents the main strength of the DMA, it can also become a source of potential weakness that may undermine its development and implementation. This policy brief argues that identified ambiguities and limitations could be reconciled by envisioning the Digital Markets Act as a place of regulatory convergence, where different areas of policy intervention can find a pro-competitive synthesis based on a market-by-market assessment and adequate remedy design.
Francesco DUCCI is a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI). His recent book, Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets (Cambridge University Press, 2020), examines the role of competition policy and regulation in digital platform markets using the theoretical lenses provided by the natural monopoly framework.