Critique internationale - Content
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Patrick Weil et Randall Hansen (dir.), Nationalité et citoyenneté en Europe, Paris, La Découverte (collection « Recherches »), 1999, 329 pages.
Pons (Philippe), Misère et crime au Japon, du XVIIe siècle à nos jours, Paris, Gallimard, 1999, 551 pages.
Jett (Dennis C.), Why Peacekeeping Fails ?, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1999, XVIII-236 pages.
Ferguson (James), Expectations of Modernity. Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999, XVII-326 pages.
Palard (Jacques), dir., Les relations internationales des régions en Europe, Études internationales (Québec), numéro spécial, volume XXX, n° 4, décembre 1999.
Ramirez (Philippe), De la disparition des chefs. Une anthropologie politique népalaise, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2000, 370 pages.
Parenti (Christian), Lockdown America. Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis, Londres et New York, Verso, 1999, 290 pages.
Allen (James), Als (Hilton), Lewis(John), Litwack (Leon F.), Without Sanctuary. Lynching Photography in America, Santa Fe (Nouveau-Mexique), Twin Palms Publishers, 2000, 209 pages.
Seymour (Michel), dir., Nationalité, citoyenneté et solidarité, Montréal, Liber, 1999, 508 pages.
[Immigration and citizenship in Europe: A survey]
A survey undertaken in the five largest European countries on attitudes towards immigration in relation to perceptions of European Union shows that hostile attitudes are not linked to objective factors (the opinion that immigrants are a threat to employment does not correlate with rates of unemployment); that national belonging is the factor which has the most influence on opinion (hostility to dual nationality is more closely linked to the fact of being German than to age or socioeconomic status); that the ongoing construction of the European Union is hardly perceived as a framework for resolving such problems, but rather as a source of additional anxiety (strong hostility to immigrants from countries that are currently candidates for membership). Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to attempt to resolve such questions within the boundaries of a given country. The solution can only lie in a more daring and less equivocal European integration.
[Where does U.S. national interest lie? Realist approaches and peripheral conflicts]
As the American presidential elections draw near, the candidates are developing their foreign policy programs, which also entails analysis of the departing President's record. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become more difficult to define U.S. national interests, as demonstrated by Bush Senior's hesitations, the evolution of Clinton's foreign policy, and debates in Congress and among foreign policy experts. If Bush Junior's program reflects a fairly classical realism (in particular, ranking problems on a scale in which human rights occupy a relatively modest place), one may ask whether giving priority to the risks of major confrontation is truly more realist in the post Cold War era than a more subtle approach which would reflect that the greatest dangers lie perhaps in what appear to be " peripheral " crises..
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[Italy and the United Kingdom: Some surprising comparisons]
Italy and the United Kingdom are quite comparable from the point of view of demography and GDP. However, their respective responses to globalization are very different. This is due to their inheritances from the previous economic period (the predominance of finance in the U.K.; the delay of industrialization in Italy…); and to differences in their respective political histories (the post-war Keynesian compromise followed by the longstanding defeat of the Left and the unions in the U.K.; the discrediting of the state to the advantage of local politics, the reintegration of the Left into the political system following its long exclusion in Italy). Today, both the success of the Italian model of small firms functioning through personalized networks, on the one hand, and the not-so-impersonal relationships which link the City to political power in Great-Britain, on the other, call into question certain fundamental principles of neo-classical and neo-liberal theories.
[German and Japanese competitiveness and egalitarianism to the test]
Germany and Japan both have markets strongly embedded in non-economic social relations and coordinated economies. How have their economies inserted themselves into globalization processes? Germany and Japan models have neither converged upon an Anglo-American model nor retained their past strengths. Rather, they are currently hybridizing: elements of liberal institutions are being selectively inserted into non-liberal contexts. Viewed in this way, liberalization works against the past advantages of cooperation among " insiders ", but also threatens distributional compromises embedded within such long-term relationships. The ultimate choice for non-liberal capitalism goes beyond simply equality versus efficiency. Rapid convergence to a liberal model would not only damage equality, but may undermine long-term competitive advantages in terms of aggregate performance.
[Taiwan and Korea, or guided globalization]
Even before the Asian crisis, Korea and Taiwan had begun to revise their models of the developmental state. Korea had deregulated its financial sector in order to escape from the strong links between the chaebols and the state, but found itself all the more vulnerable when the crisis hit. Thus it is presently the state rather than the market that is leading Korea's restructuring; in particular, the opening up of the market has been accompanied by a strong return to regulation. In Taiwan, the main challenges of globalization have been the appreciation of the NT$ followed by the prospect of Taiwan's membership (as well as China's) to the WTO. In neither case should we anticipate a neo-liberal outcome no matter how blurry the outlines of the emerging formation. Whether the challenges to developmental states are rooted in domestic or international processes, the outcomes of regulatory reforms are more likely to be consistent with pre-existing structures rather than overturn them.
[What’s left of French state capitalism?]
Beginning in l983, France transformed its state capitalism so radically that one wonders whether the most ideal-typical state-capitalist country still conforms in any way to the model. Yet France has by no means become a market-capitalist system. Rather, it has instituted a more market-oriented capitalism in which the state nevertheless retains a much more important role than in either (British) market-capitalist or (German) managed-capitalist systems. Although the state has largely given up on market-making, it continues to seek to be market-shaping, whether in business relations or industrial relations. Moreover, it has at times sought to reshape the market in a managed-capitalist direction, thus adding to the difficulties of classification. But France remains state-capitalist, albeit a pale shadow of its former self.
