Le Moyen-Orient dans les relations internationales ; Histoire contemporaine du Moyen-Orient ; Changement social et politique au Moyen-Orient

Le Moyen-Orient dans les relations internationales, Histoire contemporaine du Moyen-Orient, Changement social et politique au Moyen-Orient

THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE: UKRAINE, RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Cours de master en quatre séances hebdomadaire données à l'Académie Mohyla de Kiev, partenaire historique de Sciences Po, au mois de février 2023.

1. VLADIMIR ASSAD AND BASHAR PUTIN (February 1)
The Kremlin’s unconditional support to Assad’s war against his own people, since 2011, has too often been analyzed through geopolitical lenses. But the two leaders share a very deep intimacy that they care to protect from any outsider: both have inherited a regime in dire need of a generational facelift, Assad from his own father, Putin from hailing Yeltsin; both were bred in a KGB-style culture, where the “people” do not exist and color revolutions are only foreign plots to be mercilessly crushed; both are running a mafia-style syndicate instead of an institutionalized State and use wars to regulate such a ruling clique.

2. THE SYRIAN LABORATORY (February 8)
It is in Syria that Russia, especially after its 2015 direct military involvement, tested and expanded the terror tactics that have already proven so destructive against Ukraine: massive bombings of civilian infrastructures, self-proclaimed “humanitarian corridors” in order to trap the fleeing inhabitants, systematic violation of international law to impose submission or exodus as the only alternative, all this backed by a vicious and global campaign of fake news to deny and/or whitewash the war crimes, while the United Nations are being paralyzed by the Russian veto.

3. THE RUSSIAN-IRANIAN ALLIANCE (February 15)
It is in Syria that Moscow and Tehran forged the alliance now so aggressive against Kyiv. Iran even played a decisive role in driving Russia to a direct military campaign in 2015, after four years of providing air-support to pro-Iranian militias, and then Iranian shock troops. The Iranian drones, integrated into the Russian air offensive, were upgraded until the Shahed/Martyr-136 was developed in Syria, before being widely used against Ukraine. But it is not only a multi-faceted military partnership, since both leaderships are convinced that popular resistance should be quelled with the maximum violence if only to deter any further dissent.

4. THE POST-24 FEBRUARY MIDDLE EAST (February 22)
It is in the Middle East that, after the all-out invasion of Ukraine, Russia has scored its greatest success against the Western resolve: Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey have so far refused to endorse the financial sanctions against Russia, while Saudi Arabia chose Russia instead of the USA to broker a global partnership on oil prices. Putin has even used resources plundered in Ukraine, like wheat, to support his Syrian protégé. But the situation remains very fluid, and Russia’s gains might prove short-lived if a more proactive policy is to be followed in the region.